Resolving Dismissal Disputes: A Comparative Analysis of Public Arbitration Bodies in South Africa and England by Adam, Aisha
Resolving Dismissal Disputes: A Comparative Analysis of 
Public Arbitration Bodies in South Africa and England 
Aisha Adam 
ADMAIS003 
Dissertation presented for the degree of 
MASTERS OF LAW 
Commercial Law Department 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
Supervisor: Dr. Emma Fergus (University of Cape Town) 
Word Count: 24 321 
Research dissertation/ research paper presented for the approval of Senate in 
fulfilment of part of the requirements for the Masters of Law in approved courses 
and a minor dissertation/ research paper. The other part of the requirement for this 
qualification was the completion of a programme of courses.  
2 
PLAIGARISM DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of Masters of Law dissertations/ research papers, including those relating 
to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this 
dissertation/ research paper conforms to those regulations.  
…………………………… ………………………… 
Aisha Adam Date 
3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, I wish to thank my parents for making this whole degree possible 
– without their guidance, I would not be here. The move to Cape Town was
accompanied with a lot of ups and downs, but your support remained consistent
throughout.
To my supervisor, Dr. Emma Fergus, I cannot thank you enough for the guidance, 
countless meetings and encouraging me to not be too disheartened and to keep 
moving forward. I truly hope the quality of work I present in this dissertation attests 
to how well you have supervised me and guided me through the process of academia. 
Thank you. 
To Carla, for your constant help with the editing and tolerating my lengthy rants 
about meeting deadlines. My year at UCT would have been empty without your help 
and constant encouragement to go to the library.  
Finally, to Aalia, I believe this dissertation is only truly what it is because of your 
help and support. Thank you for helping me edit, format and persevere through to the 
end even when I felt like giving up. For everything you did, I am truly grateful. 
4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................ 8	
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 8	
CHAPTER TWO ..................................................................................................... 11	
THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM OF SOUTH 
AFRICA .................................................................................................................... 11	
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 11	
2. HISTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA ....... 12	
2.1	 Private Arbitration vs. Public Arbitration .......................................... 14	
3. LAW GOVERNING DISPUTE RESOLUTION .................................. 15	
3.1	 The Constitution ................................................................................. 15	
3.2	 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 ................................................ 16	
3.2.1	 Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA ...................................... 17	
3.2.2	 Code of Good Practice ................................................................ 18	
4. THE COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION (CCMA) ....................................................................... 19	
5. ARBITRATION PROCEDURE WHEN DEALING WITH
DISMISSAL DISPUTES ......................................................................... 21	
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 25	
CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................. 26	
SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CCMA IN RESOLVING 
DISMISSAL DISPUTES ......................................................................................... 26	
1.			INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 26	
2. SUCCESSES OF CCMA IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL DISPUTES   27
2.1	 Efficiency ........................................................................................... 27	
2.2	 Accessibility ....................................................................................... 28	
2.3	 Informality .......................................................................................... 30	
2.3.1	 Role of the courts ........................................................................ 31	
3. SHORTCOMINGS OF CCMA IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL
DISPUTES ................................................................................................ 32	
5 
3.1	 Efficiency ........................................................................................... 32	
3.2	 Accessibility ....................................................................................... 33	
3.3	 Informality .......................................................................................... 34	
4. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 36	
CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................... 38	
THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM OF ENGLAND .. 38	
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 38	
2. HISTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ENGLAND .................. 39	
3. LAWS GOVERNING DISPUTE RESOLUTION ............................... 41	
3.1	 Arbitration Act 1996 .......................................................................... 41	
3.2	 Employment Rights Act ..................................................................... 42	
3.3	 Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act .................................. 42	
3.4	 Employment Act 24 of 2008 .............................................................. 43	
4. ACAS ......................................................................................................... 44	
4.1	 ACAS Scheme ................................................................................... 45	
4.2	 ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures . 46	
5. ARBITRATION PROCEDURE WHEN DEALING WITH
DISMISSAL DISPUTES ......................................................................... 48	
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 49	
CHAPTER FIVE ..................................................................................................... 51	
SUCCESS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF ACAS IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL 
DISPUTES ................................................................................................................ 51	
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 51	
2. SUCCESSES OF ACAS IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL DISPUTES 52
2.1	 Efficiency ........................................................................................... 52	
2.2	 Accessibility ....................................................................................... 53	
2.3	 Informality .......................................................................................... 55	
3. SHORTCOMINGS OF ACAS IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL
DISPUTES ................................................................................................ 56	
3.1	 Efficiency ........................................................................................... 56	
3.2	 Accessibility ....................................................................................... 57	
3.3	 Informality .......................................................................................... 58	
6 
4. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 60	
CHAPTER SIX ........................................................................................................ 63	
THE CCMA & ACAS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 63	
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 63	
2. PITFALLS OF THE CCMA: WHAT CAN BE LEARNT FROM
ACAS? ....................................................................................................... 63	
3. PITFALLS OF ACAS: WHAT CAN BE LEARNT FROM THE
CCMA? ..................................................................................................... 67	
4. RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 70	
4.1	 CCMA ................................................................................................ 70	
4.2	 ACAS ................................................................................................. 71	
5. THE CCMA AND ACAS ........................................................................ 73	
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 73	
CHAPTER SEVEN ................................................................................................. 74	
1. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 74 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 79	
1. Primary Sources ....................................................................................... 77	
1.1	 Cases .................................................................................................. 77	
1.1.1	 South Africa ............................................................................... 77	
1.1.2	 United Kingdom ........................................................................ 77	
1.2	 Legislation and other regulatory instruments ............................... 77	
1.2.1	 South Africa ............................................................................... 77	
1.2.2	 England ...................................................................................... 77	
1.3	 International Instruments ............................................................... 78	
1.4	 Government Publications ................................................................ 78	
1.4.1	 South Africa ............................................................................... 78	
1.4.2	 United Kingdom ........................................................................ 78	
2. Secondary Sources ................................................................................... 78	
2.1	 Books ................................................................................................. 78	
2.1.1	 E-books ....................................................................................... 79
3. Journal Articles ........................................................................................ 79	
7 
3.1	 Working Paper ................................................................................. 80	




In almost every workplace around the world there is conflict, especially when it 
comes to workplace employment relations. This conflict often translates into disputes 
about rights in the employer and employee relationship. The justice system aims to 
overcome these difficulties through the balancing of power amongst the parties.1 
Unfortunately, not all these disputes are handled as effectively as others and the 
courts are left with a crisis that remains unresolved. This has increased the need for 
and value of resolving disputes through other means which provide better prospects, 
social justice and closure to the courts. 
It is apparent that the use of alternative dispute resolution to resolve disputes 
has proven useful to employees and employers over the last decade. An efficient, 
accessible and flexible dispute resolution system is one that is without a doubt 
essential to the growth and progression of any industry. Labour law in particular is 
an area wherein lies a great deal of disputes, with problems ranging from 
discrimination to unfair labour practices to dismissals. Industrial systems attract a 
great variety of dismissal disputes based on the presence of substantial human 
resources.  
The use of arbitration to resolve employment dismissal disputes has been a 
topic of interest in South Africa and England over the last decade. Both countries 
have established institutions aimed at resolving disputes with a more rapid response 
compared to litigation in the courts. As creatures of statute, both institutions aim to 
resolve disputes concerning employment in a manner that balances the rights of the 
parties whilst providing expeditious service in a manner different to the courts. In 
England, the public arbitral route is through the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service, “ACAS,” and in South Africa there is the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Services, the “CCMA.” These public 
institutions aim to ensure that alternative means of labour dispute resolution can 
resolve the issue rather than resorting to courts. 
1 Ury W.L., Brett, J.M. & Goldberg S.B, “Three approaches to resolving disputes: interests, 
rights and power” (1988). See also Lewicki, R.J., Barry, B. & Saunder, D.M. (eds), 




Dismissal disputes in South Africa and in England are often controversial and 
their resolution tends to dominate the claims that reach both the courts2 and 
alternative dispute resolution systems.3 A prominent method used to resolve 
dismissal disputes is arbitration. The primary objective of arbitration procedures in 
dismissal disputes is to provide “simple, quick, cheap and non-legalistic”4 dispute 
resolution.  
Choosing England as a source of comparison against South Africa is mainly 
due to the position England has occupied in South Africa since its colonisation. 
English law has been an influential framework for South African labour law, and still 
remains a guideline today in areas which are still developing. This historical link 
provides a solid foundation to conduct an effective comparison to evaluate whether 
each countries’ system is making steps in the right direction and how far each has 
progressed in ways the other still has to. Despite the countries’ differing political and 
socioeconomic contexts, the argument for arbitration over the use of conventional 
court litigation when resolving dismissal disputes is consistent in both labour law 
structures.5 
The intention of this dissertation is to carry out a comparative analysis of the 
arbitration processes in South Africa and England by using substantive criteria to 
evaluate whether their approaches are providing dispute resolution services to their 
users in a way that meets the needs of the parties and the objectives of the governing 
statutes. Firstly, an overview of the history, governing legislation and the arbitration 
procedure implemented in each country’s dispute resolution system is provided. The 
historical overview sets the foundation for each country’s social background and 
provides insight into the political shifts which influenced the manner in which 
industrial relations were handled. An overview of the current dispute resolution 
legislation and strategies will provide a baseline from which one can examine how 
far previous legal instruments were utilised to resolve matters.  
                                                
2 Benjamin P, “Conciliation, Arbitration and Enforcement: The CCMA’s Achievements and 
Challenges,” (2009) 30 ILJ 29. 
3 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47. See also CCMA 2015/2016 Annual Report. Report 
Number 209/2016. CCMA Publications. 
4 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47 p 20. 
5 Clark J, “Adversarial and Investigative Approaches to the arbitral resolution of dismissal 




In order to assess the growth of South Africa and England in this regard, their 
public arbitration bodies are then scrutinised and their contribution to developing 
arbitration is compared to court litigation. In the final chapters, recommendations are 
made to overcome the challenges emanating from each arbitral system. Finally, an 
evaluation is carried out showing how each system can be improved upon, with 









THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
1. INTRODUCTION  
As a growing democracy, the heart of South Africa lies in its people and their access 
to justice. The establishment of the new government brought about numerous 
changes to the development of the country; particularly, the necessity to marry the 
Constitutional rights with well-established, and reformed labour laws. In a 
developing economy, it is imperative for industries to operate coherently through 
their use of human and material resources. Unfortunately, the shift to human-based 
resources often leads to an increase in industrial disputes.  
The expectation that a labour environment unburdened by conflict is far-
fetched, as the attempt to maintain harmonious employment relationships tends to 
accentuate differing interests and objectives. This fragile relationship is further 
fragmented due to the economic and political zeitgeist that surrounded South Africa 
during apartheid, and continues to permeate society to this day. Thus, the impact of 
the working environment took its toll on the courts as the increase in disputes 
resulted in greater delays and less resolution amongst parties of dispute.  
This chapter aims to analyse the dismissal disputes procedure of South 
Africa. To do this, it is crucial to look at the background of dispute resolution 
systems. Before the commencement of the current Labour Relations Act (LRA),6 
dispute resolution was regulated by the Industrial Conciliation Act,7 which was in 
later years modified and proclaimed the Labour Relations Act 1956.8 The Industrial 
Conciliation Act,9 like its successor, was partly aimed at the prevention and 
settlement of disputes between employees and employers.10 Any labour litigation 
that took place during this period was dealt with by the Industrial Court (IC), the 
Labour Appeal Court (LAC) and the then Appellate division of the Supreme Court, 
                                                
6 Labour Relations Act (LRA) Act 66 of 1995. 
7 Industrial Conciliation Act, Act 28 of 1956 subsequently renamed the Labour Relations Act 
1956. 
8 Labour Relations Act 1956. 
9 Industrial Conciliation Act, Act 28 of 1956. 




acting as the highest court in labour issues.11 Civil courts also played a substantial 
role in employment and labour matters.12 
Furthermore, this chapter will address the substantial legislative documents 
that were implemented to resolve historical problems. This includes prominent 
governing instruments such as the Constitution as well as the reformed LRA. 
Additionally, the shift to the governing alternative dispute resolution body, the 
“Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA),” following the 
abolition of apartheid will be evaluated, as well as the CCMA’s procedures in 
relation to arbitration in dismissal cases.  
2. HISTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Before analysing and scrutinising the dispute resolution system of South Africa, one 
must look at its background and history. The history of South Africa plays a crucial 
role in the way the framework of its labour legislature stands today. Ferreira13 
describes the importance of reviewing South Africa’s history as a means leading to a 
greater understanding of our current situation and evaluating how South Africa has 
progressed as a country.14 The domination of conflict between worker groups as well 
as the dualistic system that arose during these historical periods showed how far 
labour relations affected the dispute resolution system.15  
Prior to 1994, the South African labour arena was characterised by an 
agricultural economy, and the discovery of gold in 1886 led to the beginning of an 
industrial revolution.16 Due to the principles of apartheid, classification of workers 
was by race, skills and language.17 During this time, the government passed a series 
of legislation to resolve labour disputes. However, the only form of dispute 
resolution mechanisms was the Industrial councils.18 Due to the increase in 
urbanisation, shortages of food and inadequate jobs, especially amongst black 
workers, it was clear something needed to be done. The Industrial Legislation 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ferreira G, “The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration: Its effectiveness in 
dispute resolution in labour relations” (2004) Politeia vol 23 No 2 p73. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, p74 
17 Ibid. 




Commission of 1935 considered a labour tribunal.19 This idea of a labour tribunal 
was turned down, but shortly after, a National Labour Board proposed a tribunal with 
a more lenient approach to rules and procedure.20 Ironically, this too was turned 
down until the Industrial tribunal was set up in terms of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act 28 of 1956.21 By the time the Wiehahn Commission was set up in 1979,22 the 
criterion of race ceased to be a factor in recognising trade unions.23  
Additionally, the socio-political changes resulted in a variety of dispute 
resolution developments, such as the 1979 Industrial Court with the legal status of a 
quasi-judicial tribunal,24 and the ways in which decisions of the court were reviewed 
or appealed. Initially, any reviews to the industrial courts’ decisions could be brought 
to the Supreme Court.25 However, following the amendments to the LRA in 1988, a 
Labour Appeal Court was formed consisting of six separate divisions. The majority 
of the appeals were brought for unfair labour practices under s 17(21A)(a) of the 
Labour Relations Act of 1956.26   
It remains, however, that the abolition of apartheid in 1994 led to the greatest 
changes to labour law, including the reformation of legislation and re-organisation of 
numerous governmental institutions.27 The implementation of the Labour Relations 
Act (LRA) in 199528 resulted in significant changes to the labour institutions in 
South Africa. The procedures carried out by the courts prior to the new Act29 were 
lengthy, complex and ineffective in resolving disputes. One of the paramount 
changes made to dispute resolution during this time was to the handling of dismissal 
disputes. Prior to the Act, dismissal disputes were handled rather poorly as they were 
tedious and expensive, resulting in unsatisfactory results.30 For example, the case of 
Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule31 took the Supreme Court of Appeal 
                                                
19 Fergus E & Rycroft A, “Refining review” 2012 Acta Juridica p170.   
20 Ibid. 
21 Industrial Conciliation Act, Act 28 of 1956. 
22 Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation part 1 RP 47/1979. 
23 Ferreira G, “The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration: Its effectiveness in 
dispute resolution in labour relations”(2004) Politeia vol 23 No 2 p75. 
24 Fergus E & Rycroft A, “Refining review” 2012 Acta Juridica p172. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Industrial Conciliation Act, Act 28 of 1956. 
27 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47 p1. 
28 The Labour Relations Act (LRA), Act 66 of 1995. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Backer, W and Olivier, M, “Guide to the New Labour Relations Act” (1996) p7. 




approximately ten years to resolve. The case involved the dismissal of workers 
participating in an unlawful strike.32 Brand33 describes the system of dispute 
resolution in the past as something which simply failed to work.  
It is clear that dispute resolution institutions in the past were prone to 
changing with the socio-political environment of the time. As racial bias no longer 
served any legislative significance after 1994, the drafters of the LRA could focus on 
aligning the institution with the principles of a democratic system. The revolutionary 
change in this era was found in the new LRA statute,34 through the formation of a 
new independent body set to serve and resolve disputes through alternative means 
such as conciliation, mediation and arbitration. This body, known as the CCMA, 
possessed juristic personality and aimed to play a vital role in the resolution of 
disputes.  
2.1 Private Arbitration vs. Public Arbitration 
Private arbitration for employment disputes has been in the labour arena since the 
early 1980’s.35 It has been used as an alternative form of dispute resolution to that set 
out in the LRA of 1956 for a variety of reasons. Its main concern was to address 
issues that existed in the court procedures at the time, including lengthy court delays 
and uncertainty in legal principles regarding labour matters.36 The successes of 
private arbitration tribunals, such as IMMSA (Independent Mediation Services of 
South Africa), spurred on the formation of the CCMA. One of IMMSA’s major 
advantages over conventional methods was its ability to reduce the time taken to 
resolve dismissal disputes.37 
One of the significant differences between private and public arbitration is 
that the process is conducted by agreement between the parties who have discretion 
in choosing an arbitrator, references and powers.38 Another difference is that the 
governing statute for a private arbitrator to derive authority over their powers is 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Brand, J; Lotter, C; Mischke, C and Steadman, F, “Labour Dispute Resolution” (1997) Juta 
& Co. Ltd p26. 
34 The Labour Relations Act (LRA), Act 66 of 1995. 
35 Jordaan B, “Jordaan B & Stelzner: Labour Arbitration with a commentary on the CCMA 
rules,” 2nd ed (2011) p4. 
36 Ibid. 
37 O’Regan, C, “The development of private labour arbitration in South Africa: A review of the 
arbitration awards” (1989) 10 ILJ 557. 
38 Jordaan B, “Jordaan B & Stelzner: Labour Arbitration with a commentary on the CCMA 




through the Arbitration Act,39 whereas public arbitration is governed by the LRA. 
Furthermore, most of the formalities present in private arbitration are usually 
dependent on the discretion of the parties, whereas in public arbitration the 
government or the CCMA usually determines them.  
The law regulations of dispute resolution and the creation of the CCMA will 
be discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
3. LAW GOVERNING DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
Before looking at the CCMA in-depth, it is essential to describe the legal instruments 
leading up to its formation. The first labour relations statute was the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924. The Act was a ground-breaking instrument that established 
a framework for collective bargaining, dispute resolution and industrial action.40 
Unfortunately, it prejudiced black workers,41 and this entrenchment of preventing 
them from obtaining key qualifications resulted in racially discriminating job 
reservations.42  
After being under immense pressure from independent trade union 
movements, labour legislation was reformed to extend labour relations to public 
servants.43 Towards the end of apartheid, the 1993 Interim Constitution entrenched 
numerous labour rights and changes, which led to the inexorable drift towards the 
Labour Relations Act.44  
3.1 The Constitution 
As with any country, the Constitution45 is the foundation for the basic rights 
endowed upon its citizens. The Constitution is said to be an embodiment of the will 
of the people,46 and unlike statutory regimes, this instrument represents a greater 
scheme as its enforcement covers a larger spectrum. Although s 23 of the 
                                                
39 Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)”(2013) ILO No 47 p2. 
42 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47 p3. 
43 Fergus E & Rycroft A, “Refining review,” 2012 Acta Juridica p171. 
44 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47 p1. 
45 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 





Constitution embodies the main rights concerning labour relations, there is no 
explicit mention of dispute resolution or dismissals. Rather, this section describes the 
rights to which every employee is entitled, such as “fair labour practice, to form and 
join a trade union, to strike…”47  
On the other hand, s 33 outlines the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.48 This provision imposes an obligation on 
commissioners to perform functions according to the conditions set out in s 33 of the 
Constitution; ensuring transparency is encouraged throughout public 
administration.49 Furthermore, s 34 stipulates “the right to have any dispute, which 
can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a 
court, or where appropriate, another impartial tribunal or forum.”50 This signifies 
that dispute resolution should not be limited to courts or conventional forms of 
litigation but rather be open to the possibility and promotion of alternative 
mechanisms. Traditionally, court litigation proves to be tedious, lengthy and “pitted 
with technicalities,”51 while other means of dispute resolution may prove to be more 
cost effective and efficient, thus opening more doors to justice.  
3.2 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
The creation of the LRA was aimed at restructuring the legal and the organisational 
foundations of collective labour law and unfair dismissal law. Its goal was to create a 
coherent legal instrument that would provide guidance in labour relations applicable 
to all sectors of the economy. One of the main purposes of the LRA was to 
revolutionise the labour system in South Africa as the framework for handling 
disputes prior to the LRA was criticised as “contradictory, chaotic and casuistic.”52  
The LRA intended to provide user-friendly procedures using alternative 
means of dispute resolution. Another prominent function of the LRA is set out in s 1, 
which stipulates that the purpose is to “advance economic development, social 
justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the 
                                                
47 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 23. 
48 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 33. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 24. 
51 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47 p3. 
52 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 




primary objects of this Act…”53 A “primary object” described in s 1 is to “promote 
the effective resolution of labour disputes.”54 Steenkamp and Bosch55 noted that an 
effective dispute resolution system is one that is structured, accessible and 
inexpensive, and it is one that resolves disputes finally.56 
The primary vehicle for alternative dispute resolution is the CCMA, which 
has a mandate to resolve most dismissal disputes. Interest-based disputes are usually 
resolved through industrial action or collective bargaining, while disputes of rights 
are usually resolved through conciliation or adjudication.57 The first stage in 
dismissal dispute resolution is always conciliation, but if the disputes remain 
unresolved, it may be adjudicated or arbitrated under the CCMA or an accredited 
bargaining council.58  
3.2.1 Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA 
Section 112 of the LRA59 led to the creation of two new institutions for adjudication 
and the resolution of disputes; the CCMA and a system of labour courts. In order to 
address why the LRA was establishing new bodies of resolution, it is necessary to 
look at the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA.60 This document outlines the 
main motivations behind the changes to the labour system but also indicates why the 
LRA61 was promulgated in the first place.  
It is no news that the dispute resolution processes prior to the democratic shift 
in politics was not working. The turbulent strikes and the inability to resolve issues 
timeously and effectively proved the breakdown in the statutory system of dispute 
resolution in the country.62 According to the statistics provided by the Labour 
Department, less than 30 per cent of the disputes referred to industrial councils were 
settled and approximately 20 per cent of the conciliation boards resulted in 
                                                
53 The Labour Relations Act (LRA), Act 66 of 1995, s 1. See Also s 3 of the LRA. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Steenkamp A & Bosch C, “Labour dispute resolution under the 1995 LRA: Problems, 




59 The Labour Relations Act (LRA), Act 66 of 1995., s 112. 
60 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 278.  
61 The Labour Relations Act (LRA), Act 66 of 1995. 




settlement.63 At the time, it was evident that independent mediation services were 
proving more successful with a success rate of over 70 per cent.64 
Another problem evident in the labour system was that the conciliation 
procedures were too technical and any errors made would often prejudice an 
applicant’s claim. One of the main issues was that the merits of the case were not 
considered, and this often led to workers resorting to other means when resolving 
their problems.65 Therefore, strikes and the high cost implications thereof left the 
whole statutory regime of resolving disputes ineffective.66 
Furthermore, if any applicant had to make a claim, not only would 
understanding the process seem technical but this was further complicated when the 
adjudication system had its own burdens. For starters, the Industrial Court held no 
status in the judiciary based on the courts’ remuneration and their job security.67 
Secondly, any appeals to the courts resulted in lengthy delays, which often defeated 
the whole purpose of gaining an appeal due to the tardiness in when it is heard. 
Finally, there was an overlap between the courts’ jurisdictions when it came to 
appeals and it was clear that the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) held no standing in 
labour relations as the Supreme Court reigned supreme.68  
Thus, the draft LRA bill called for the establishment of an independent but 
government-funded organisation dedicated to resolving disputes. The draft bill also 
provided for the resolution of a variety of disputes by arbitration and conciliation, 
including dismissals.  
3.2.2 Code of Good Practice 
A prominent feature of the LRA when dealing with dismissal disputes is the Code of 
Good Practice described in Schedule 8.69 The Code of Good Practice is meant to 
provide “legitimate, coherent, accessible and flexible jurisprudence”70 when it comes 
to dispute resolution and other labour relations, and lays out the approach to adopt 
                                                
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 278 p327. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 278 p326. 
68 Ibid. 





regarding dismissals. This is fitting given that the majority of arbitration cases 
revolve around unfair dismissal matters.71  
S 138 (10) of the LRA72 instructs commissioners to adhere to these Codes 
when interpreting the LRA and dealing with arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, 
the idea behind implementing Codes within a legislative framework is to aid in 
educating employers and employees in resolving disciplinary issues. However, 
Benjamin73 observes that unfortunately, this proposal has been less than successful in 
simplifying disciplinary procedures by promoting the combination of “soft law”74 
and the Act.75 
In short, the LRA aimed to establish a labour law administration that met 
international benchmarks, whilst at the same time codifying a body of 
jurisprudence76 and meeting the primary objectives of fair labour relations set out in 
the Constitution. 
4. THE COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION (CCMA)  
As a juristic independent body, the CCMA, once referred to as a “one-stop-shop,”77 
is the LRA’s solution to resolving labour disputes. Its functions include dispute 
resolution, dispute management, and an institution within the labour arena aimed at 
providing re-education for employers and employees.78 The CCMA offers an 
inexpensive route for the public to bring matters to the table relating to dismissals, 
trade unions, unfair labour practice as well as interest disputes appearing from 
collective bargaining.79 The primary purpose of the CCMA was to set out a method 
for promoting social justice and fairness in the workplace.80 This was to be carried 
                                                
71 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47. See also CCMA 2015/2016 Annual Report. Report 
Number 209/2016. CCMA Publications. 
72 The Labour Relations Act, s 138 (10). 
73 Benjamin P, “Conciliation, Arbitration and Enforcement: The CCMA’s Achievements and 
Challenges,” (2009) 30 ILJ 26 p27. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA)” (2013) ILO No 47 p1. 
77 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 278  p327. 
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out through ethical and innovative services of the highest quality that are in 
compliance with the law.81 
Carephone v Marcus NO & Others82 is a significant case when it comes to 
identifying the duties of the CCMA and its commissioners as arbiters of an 
administrative tribunal. Although the test for review established in Carephone has 
been adjusted by Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others,83 the case 
remains relevant today when describing the obligations of the CCMA in relation to 
constitutional rights. According to Froneman DJP, the CCMA Commissioners are 
obliged to respect the parties’ fundamental rights, remain impartial, ensure fairness 
and remain unprejudiced throughout the arbitration proceedings.84 By examining and 
interpreting sections s 136 to 138 of the LRA85 carefully, the court ensured that the 
Act complied with these constitutional standards.86 
Section 138 of the LRA87 expressly outlines the nature of the commissioners’ 
discretionary powers and the way the proceedings are to be carried out.88 This 
section clearly describes that the commissioner must expeditiously and fairly carry 
out the proceedings whilst addressing the merits of the case and staying within the 
minimum legal constraints.89 The whole purpose of these provisions was to ensure 
flexibility and efficiency throughout the CCMA arbitrations.90  
Section 115 of the LRA91 details that the CCMA is given the full discretion to 
perform functions required for effective dispute resolution and at the same time has 
the power to delegate these functions.92 One of the mandatory functions is to resolve 
all disputes referred for conciliation in terms of the LRA, and to perform the 
arbitration of those issues referred from conciliation that have the opportunity to be 
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arbitrated in terms of the LRA or any other statue.93 Another function of the CCMA 
includes the discretion to perform a variety of tasks, including advising parties about 
the procedures to be followed when referring disputes for conciliation and 
arbitration, and helping applicants obtain sound and impartial legal advice.94 
Furthermore, the CCMA may “offer to resolve a dispute that had not been referred to 
the CCMA through conciliation.”95 This provision allows for the services provided 
by the CCMA to be available to all parties in major disputes. 
The drafters of the LRA set out to use arbitration as a binding means to 
resolve disputes in order to avoid the formal, tedious and costly procedures of 
litigation. The main purpose accompanying this feature was to reduce industrial 
action96 and provide a “legitimate alternative process.”97 Interestingly, prior to public 
arbitration, there was a means of alternative dispute resolution through private 
arbitration.98 The next section aims to describe the process of arbitration when 
dealing with dismissal disputes through the CCMA. 
5. ARBITRATION PROCEDURE WHEN DEALING WITH DISMISSAL 
DISPUTES 
Now that the history and background of dispute resolution, as well as the 
development of one of the LRA’s most valuable creations, the CCMA, has been 
reviewed, an outline of how arbitration is handled by the CCMA during dismissals 
shall be analysed. Arbitration proceedings are purposefully disconnected from the 
structure of the courts.99 The CCMA is not part of the public service despite being 
financed by the state. Thus, it is clear that the government wishes to acknowledge the 
independence of the CCMA.100  
A noteworthy function of the CCMA is arbitration in relation to unfair 
dismissals issues, which is described in s 191 (5) as follows: 
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S 191.  (5) If a council or a commissioner has certified that the dispute 
remains unresolved, or if 30 days have expired since the council or the 
Commission received the referral and the dispute remains unresolved 
– 
(a) the council or the Commission must arbitrate the dispute at the 
request of the employee if- 
(i) the employee has alleged that the reason for dismissal related to the 
employee's conduct or capacity, unless paragraph (b)(iii) applies; 
(ii) the employee has alleged that the reason for dismissal is that the 
employer made continued employment intolerable or the employer 
provided the employee with substantially less favourable conditions 
or circumstances at work after a transfer in terms of section 197 or 
197A, unless the employee alleges that the contract of employment 
was terminated for a reason contemplated in section 187;101 
The CCMA will only arbitrate on a dispute if a commissioner has issued a 
certificate after conciliation that the dismissal remains unresolved. At this point, the 
applicant party will sign a LRA Form 7.13102 and serve the document to the other 
parties and CCMA within 90 days of when the certificate of outcome was issued.103 
If necessary, the dispute may have to undergo pre-arbitration;104 following this, the 
parties may send a request to appoint a senior commissioner. It is imperative that any 
commissioner assigned to the dispute should remain free from bias.105  
Additionally, the CCMA has increasingly used the process of con-arb to 
resolve disputes.106 As a mix of both conciliation and arbitration, it is a “one sitting 
process.”107 The procedure starts with conciliation and if the parties cannot agree, the 
conciliator shifts to arbitration, with the aim to expeditiously deal with the issue in 
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one day. However, employers tend to object to the dispute being processed as con-
arb. In many cases, the objection is made automatically as the referral form to use 
con-arb gives the employer an option to object without having to provide reasons. If 
con-arb has been rejected, the ordinary process resumes and the employee will need 
to refer the dispute to arbitration within 90 days of failing to conciliate the issue.108 
There is no regimented procedure outlined in the LRA as to how arbitration 
proceedings should be carried out. In fact, it is entirely at the commissioner’s 
discretion as to how they are conducted. The law merely requires that a dispute be 
determined “fairly and quickly” while taking cognisance of the “substantial merits of 
a dispute with a minimum of legal formalities.”109 In Naraindath v CCMA,110 the 
court described that arbitration procedures should not be a “slavish imitation” of 
court processes and that commissioners should follow the procedures outlined in the 
small claims court, which was endorsed by the LAC.111  
According to s 138 (2) of the LRA, a party is entitled to “give evidence, call 
witnesses, question the witness of any other party and address any remarks to the 
commissioner.”112 Benjamin113 describes the procedure of arbitration as a milder 
version of a civil trial114, and states that an arbitrator must decide whether the 
approach to the arbitration will be carried out as adversarial or inquisitorial.115 This 
inevitably led to guidelines which described the appropriate approach to adopt in a 
particular circumstance. The guidelines stipulate that an inquisitorial technique will 
often be required if one or both parties are unrepresented or the representative is 
inexperienced.116 Labour Court decisions have requested that the CCMA, when 
conducting arbitration, give clear directions to the parties as to how the proceedings 
shall be carried out.117 
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The arbitration process is a new hearing which means that the evidence is 
heard afresh before the arbitrator who will then determine whether the dismissal is 
fair.118 During the preliminary stages, the arbitrator must ensure that the parties have 
been identified and that the preliminary issues have been addressed. If the matter is 
resolved at this point, then the arbitrator may provide a ruling on the decision 
together with reasons for the final award.119 Any request for legal representation will 
also be handled during the preliminary stage under Rule 25 of the Conduct of 
Proceedings before the CCMA.120 The arbitrator will then move on to narrowing the 
issues, and identify whether there was a fair dismissal in terms of the Code of Good 
Practice.121  
The next stage involves the calling of witnesses to whom questions may be 
asked, followed by arguments. According to part C of the guidelines, the award, 
accompanied by brief reasons, is decided upon within 14 days after the arbitration 
process, the time period that mandates the CCMA to hand down the award.122 When 
the arbitrator is faced with the procedural fairness of a dismissal, they must have 
cognizance of item 4 of the Code of Good Practice.123 Additionally, item 7 addresses 
substantive fairness in relation to misconduct dismissals, item 9 issues guidelines in 
cases of dismissal for poor work performance, item 10 lays out incapacity dismissals 
and item 11 looks at dismissals arising from ill health or injury.124  
Upon conclusion of the proceedings, the commissioner will make an award 
which is final and binding upon the parties.125 Under s 145 of the LRA,126 these 
decisions are subject to review at the Labour Court within six weeks from the date on 
which the award was served upon the applicant. This review may only be made 
based on the misconduct of an arbitrator, gross irregularities in the arbitration 
proceeding or if the arbitrator was acting in excess of his or her powers.127 The 
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grounds for reviews are not as narrow as s 145, which has been heavily 
supplemented by the decision in Sidumo,128 addressed in detail in chapter three.   
Therefore, it appears that arbitration processes intend to endorse flexibility 
and simplicity in their steps to resolve dismissal disputes. The combination of the 
Code of Good Practice129 and the LRA130 provides a coherent method of undertaking 
dismissal arbitration hearings. The Code stipulates how evidence should be analysed 
and how awards should be granted.131 Furthermore, it also outlines the pertinent legal 
principles when determining whether a dismissal is procedurally and substantively 
fair.132  
6. CONCLUSION 
With the implementation of the LRA, it is clear that there is an aim to simplify the 
resolution procedures in South Africa. This chapter has outlined the growth of the 
dispute resolution system in South Africa prior to the LRA, up until the creation of 
the CCMA. The development of dispute resolution, especially in dismissal cases, has 
provided employers and employees more avenues to express their concerns. 
Arbitration during dismissals directs the actions of parties toward a process of mutual 
fairness and accountability.133 The emphasis in dismissal disputes is on the CCMA, 
its development and its means of resolving matters in the most effective way without 
resorting to litigation. The use of arbitration as a means of resolving dismissals 
allows the court more time to deal with issues such as discriminatory practice and 
retrenchments. Finally, the aim of creating the CCMA was to offer a user-friendly 
method to resolve issues, especially through arbitration techniques and procedures. 
The next chapter will provide a detailed discussion evaluating the CCMA’s 
action in dismissals in order to address its successes and shortcomings. 
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SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CCMA IN RESOLVING 
DISMISSAL DISPUTES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the CCMA has resulted in an exceptional level of contact between 
justice and employees, especially for those of whom were unfairly dismissed.134 The 
organisation was established with the aim of providing accessible, inexpensive and 
rapid dispute resolution in the most common categories of labour disputes. To truly 
understand the development of the CCMA, it is essential to assess its successes and 
shortcomings since its establishment. The CCMA has been given legislative 
authorisation to resolve dismissal disputes using a method that aims to avoid the 
detail and delay that are dominant features of the court adjudication system.135 This 
chapter will outline how the CCMA has faced numerous successes and shortcomings 
in resolving dismissal disputes since its establishment. 
The first part of this chapter aims to assess the successes of the CCMA in its 
role of efficiently resolving dismissal disputes through arbitration. During the 
formation of the CCMA, the strategy was to shift from the conventional method of 
establishing specialist labour tribunals towards increasing accessibility and 
efficiency. This assessment will be achieved by drawing on information recorded in 
the Annual Report136 of the CCMA as well as other considerable resources. The 
second part of this chapter will focus on the shortcomings and challenges the CCMA 
faces, particularly expanding on how far the CCMA has met the objectives laid out 
in the Explanatory Memorandum of 1995.137 
Since the intention of the drafters was to establish an organisation that could 
provide accessible, informal and efficient dispute resolution, these criteria will serve 
as the indicators in evaluating the achievements and challenges of the CCMA.  
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Furthermore, since individuals have the opportunity to rate the service of the CCMA, 
this allows for an assessment of the quality of the system.138  
2. SUCCESSES OF CCMA IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL DISPUTES 
2.1 Efficiency 
An efficient dispute resolution system is one that is swift in resolving disputes with 
high settlement rates in a short period of time.139 Conversely, systems that are 
sluggish and delay in producing results are inefficient.140 When it comes to the 
CCMA, efficiency with respect to arbitrations and conciliations relates to the time it 
takes the CCMA to conclude these proceedings. The effective resolution of 
disputes141 is paramount in achieving the objectives set out by the LRA. CCMA 
commissioners are obliged to take both parties’ interests into account when resolving 
the dismissal dispute. The LRA stipulates142 that the CCMA should arbitrate disputes 
within 90 days, while the CCMA sets a tighter internal deadline of 60 days.143 
Therefore, the CCMA must aim to complete arbitrations within 60 days after the 
request for arbitration.144  
In comparison to the time it takes for court proceedings to be carried out, it is 
clear the CCMA’s time limit promotes efficiency. Moreover, the arbitrator is 
required to make an award with reasons, within 14 days of the hearing.145 Despite the 
influx of cases referred to the CCMA, the goal of hosting arbitrations rapidly has 
been achieved, as the average time taken to conclude an arbitration hearing is 70 
days from the date the dispute was initially referred for conciliation.146 During its 
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formative years, the CCMA’s arbitration cases account for 30 per cent of the cases 
processed.147  
It is also important to note that the number of arbitrations heard increased 
from the previous year by nine per cent, based on the annual CCMA report of 
2016.148 149 The late awards submitted by commissioners decreased by a significant 
167 per cent, and this area continues to be controlled. Furthermore, from the total 17 
333 awards rendered, 29 were sent late to the parties, a reduction of 93 per cent from 
the previous year. This clearly shows the CCMA’s increasing expeditiousness in its 
case management.150 
2.2 Accessibility 
Accessibility is the ability to effectively access redress systems in order to gain 
unbiased outcomes.151 Accessibility is an important ingredient in an effective dispute 
resolution system. CCMA arbitration proceedings are designed to be an accessible 
and inexpensive route for workers at the point of entry.152 Leeds and Wöcke153 find 
the CCMA accessible due to the excessive number of disputes referred to the CCMA 
and the high number of out-of-jurisdiction cases.154 The increase in the number of 
claims that are made in time, and the fact that employees can lodge claims by 
reporting to the CCMA offices where the relevant personnel can assist them to 
complete the referral forms prove the process’s simplicity.155 This means that cost, 
availability of centres, qualifications and any other personal skills will not be a 
barrier to accessing the dispute resolution institute.156 The CCMA has established 
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over 20 regional offices157 around the country in order to make the institution easily 
available to parties thereby achieving accessibility.  
Accessibility has also been promoted through the CCMA’s limitation of legal 
representation. This factor is beneficial when aiming to reduce time and costs. 
During dismissal arbitration, legal representation is forbidden unless agreed upon or 
permitted by an arbitrator based on either public interest or the complexity in which 
the question of law was raised.158 Legal practitioners are restricted during dismissal 
arbitration due to the perception that lawyers are pricey and legalistic, which go 
against the tenets of the CCMA.159  
Rule 25 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before the CCMA160 
stipulates that legal representation during arbitration is limited. This is the case 
during unfair dismissal disputes relating to misconduct or incapacity.161 Rule 25(c) 
(1) and (2)162 states that legal representation will only be allowed under the following 
circumstances: 
Rule 25 (c) (1) the commissioner and all the other parties consent; 
(2) the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to 
expect a party to deal with the dispute without legal 
representation, after considering: 
(a) the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; 
(b) the complexity of the dispute; 
(c) the public interest; and 
(d) the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their 
representatives to deal with the dispute.163 
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Despite Rule 25, there has been uncertainty about representation in 
dismissals. In Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics Mudau NO & 
others,164 the constitutional right to be legally represented in arbitration proceedings 
was addressed, but it was held that in terms of common law, no such absolute right 
has been created.165 The Supreme Court of Appeal in CCMA v The Law Society of 
Northern Provinces confirmed this judgment,166 whereby the court held that the rule 
was sufficiently flexible to permit legal representation.167 According to Benjamin,168 
employers and employees only have legal representation in approximately 15 per 
cent of dismissal arbitrations in 2013. The CCMA clearly wishes to reduce the risk 
of the arbitration process from becoming lengthy and drawn out which could often 
be the case when representatives are involved in the process. 
Another method whereby the CCMA has proved its accessibility is through 
its free service169 towards the public when referring unfair dismissal disputes as well 
as other unfair labour practices. Costs often serve as a deterrent when employees 
wish to raise disputes; fortunately, the CCMA has resolved this issue. However, the 
CCMA commissioner may make cost awards, but they are very rare and are usually 
reserved for exceptional situations.170  
2.3 Informality  
The next crucial criterion by which the CCMA can be measured is its informality. 
This factor is important, as it is a clear contrast from the stringency of court 
proceedings. Genn171 describes informality as a dispute resolution institution in 
which the procedures are so simple to grasp that an applicant can start a case, prepare 
for submission and present at a hearing by themselves.172 The whole process is meant 
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to radically reduce the formalities of the conventional court process, involving less 
dense technicalities, less complications and limited legal representation.173  
The absence of complex details is successful in ensuring that there are fewer 
barriers to the system. The only condition required for bringing a dispute to the 
CCMA is that an applicant submit two forms in which the dispute is laid out in 
general terms.174 Section 138 of the LRA outlines the manner in which arbitration 
proceedings are to be held.175 Moreover, the legislature’s advocacy for flexibility in 
dismissal issues is emphasised in the enactment of its “soft law” instrument, the 
Code of Good Practice.176  
2.3.1 Role of the courts 
Appeals against the decisions of arbitrators are not allowed but they are subject to 
judicial review by the Labour Court which is then, in turn, subject to appeal by the 
Labour Appeal Court and the Constitutional Court.177 However, parties afflicted by a 
commissioner’s decisions are limited to instituting review proceedings based on the 
grounds set out in s 145 of the LRA.178 The narrow scope of these reasons, which 
bear resemblance to those in private arbitration awards under s 33 of the Arbitration 
Act,179 aim to discourage reviews of CCMA awards due to the technicalities of court 
practices.180 Arbitration reviews are held under the same pressures as arbitration 
proceedings, in that a strict time limit of six weeks is set for a review application to 
be filed.181 The raisons d’etre is to prevent unnecessary delays and to coincide with 
the initial aims of approachability and haste, thereby upholding an effective dispute 
resolution system. 
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3. SHORTCOMINGS OF CCMA IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL DISPUTES 
3.1 Efficiency 
It is important to remember that despite the high standards set by the CCMA in 
achieving its objectives, failures are inevitable and every developing system is bound 
to suffer from setbacks. The way a system deals with these setbacks determines how 
far it is able to adapt to any forthcoming development to survive. Ironically, an 
example of this is delays; in arbitration, the CCMA notes that in order to deal with 
cases efficiently, commissioners are usually obligated to do up to three arbitrations 
per day.182 
This obligation places both the commissioner and the management under a 
great deal of pressure to deal with the exorbitant amount of cases, and this may affect 
the quality of administration. The CCMA staff may often feel overburdened with 
cases and this could lead to inefficiencies, unnecessary delays and an extensive waste 
of resources.183 This obstacle in arbitration proceedings proves that unless screening 
is properly undertaken, a negative perception of the institution may arise amongst 
users.184 
Another shortcoming in the CCMA’s efficiency is when dealing with review 
matters. Benjamin notes that parties that have access to resources may institute 
appeal proceedings for tactical delaying purposes despite having no intention of 
pursuing the issue.185 According to Benjamin, 10 to 15 per cent of arbitration awards 
are sent for review proceedings.186 Statistics show that in 2006, it took approximately 
23 months from the date of the arbitration award for the review to be heard and a 
further three months for the judgment to be delivered.187  
Reviews should be carried out based on the requirements laid out in s 145188 
without looking at the merits of the case. Unfortunately, it has proven difficult for the 
courts to adhere to this principle and they often overstep this boundary by engaging 
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in the merits.189 In the case of Herholdt,190 the court suggested that to permit reviews 
rather than appeals has not succeeded in an efficient dispute resolution system and 
that an appeal system may prove less complex and more determinative of the 
issues.191 However, the court has somewhat resolved this issue through the 
enforcement of the reasonable test as laid out in Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd & others,192 which is a much broader and complex test.193 The 
Court held that the correct standard of a review of a commissioner’s award or ruling 
is the reasonableness standard and an administrative decision can only be reviewable 
in a situation whereby a reasonable decision maker, based on the content before 
them, could not reach that decision.194 
3.2 Accessibility 
Although having a free and easily accessible system proves highly beneficial 
to employees wishing to have their cases heard, severe difficulties arise for the 
CCMA due to its wide scope of jurisdiction and their lack of human and financial 
resources.195 The lack of legal representation may provide a cheaper and easier way 
of dealing with dismissal arbitration, but this approach fails to identify the valuable 
contribution lawyers can make during dismissal arbitrations, as they can often be 
very sympathetic to simple processes.196  
The idea of a free dispute resolution service remains complex, as nothing is 
ever truly free of charge; there is always a price. The influx of cases to the CCMA 
has resulted in a shortage of resources and has placed the commissioners under 
enormous pressure.197 The case management staff are often too busy and poorly 
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skilled to assist workers in organising the disputes into the correct processes. This 
results in unnecessary technical issues, delays and a substantial waste of resources.198  
3.3 Informality 
One of the main challenges the CCMA faces is dealing with s 138 of the 
LRA,199 as this provision tends to portray a contradiction between s 138(1) and s 
138(2), concerning whether the commissioner is to uphold an inquisitorial or 
adversarial approach. The section reads as follows: 
s 138 (1) The commissioner may conduct the arbitration in a manner 
that the commissioner considers appropriate in order to 
determine the dispute fairly and quickly, but must deal with 
the substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal 
formalities. 
(2) Subject to the discretion of the commissioner as to the 
appropriate form of the proceedings, a party to the dispute 
may give evidence, call witnesses, question the witnesses of 
any other party, and address concluding arguments to the 
commissioner.200 
Despite the provision claiming that the way in which the proceedings are 
carried out is up to the discretion of the commissioner,201 none of the CCMA public 
documents stipulate this; instead, they represent the rights as absolute.202 Whilst this 
issue was resolved with the implementation of the CCMA Guidelines,203 it is 
apparent that the commissioner’s discretion is capped.204 This point will be addressed 
in more detail in chapter six.  
Whilst the lack of formality makes the infrastructure appealing when dealing with 
dismissals, there remains ambiguity over what approach to adopt. According to 
Benjamin, the wording “fairly and quickly” set out in s 138 emphasises the need to 
meet both requirements of fairness and expeditiousness whilst upholding the rights 
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of the parties. Despite the inquisitorial tactics laid out by the CCMA, it is evident 
that commissioners conduct arbitrations in an adversarial manner so as to adopt the 
safer approach similar to the court processes.205 
One of the main motivators behind the formation of the CCMA was IMSSA. 
Whilst IMSSA’s processes may have seemed practical at first, they failed to consider 
the Constitutional rights required when undertaking arbitration proceedings. Every 
CCMA applicant has a constitutional right to “fair labour practice”206 and more 
importantly to “just administrative action.”207 Unfortunately, the requirement of 
carrying out these rights under the inquisitorial approach often seems unsuitable and 
will require the adoption of an adversarial approach to aid in exercising these rights.  
Dealing with dismissal disputes may prove to be more complex for parties 
than it appears. The CCMA has been criticised in the past for its inconsistency 
regarding the approach to procedural fairness.208 It was initially proposed that the 
Code of Good Practice on Dismissal would be regularly updated by NEDLAC. 
Unfortunately, this has not occurred, and despite the CCMA Governing Body’s 
published guidelines for arbitrators, there is still a lack of clarity when it comes to the 
arbitration procedures when employees from small employers are dismissed. 209 
Finally, the most significant issue is that, on the surface, the CCMA appears 
to benefit big employers more than smaller ones. In fact, small employers bring 
dispute claims more frequently to the CCMA than large employers.210 Unfortunately, 
it is these small and unskilled businesses that suffer most from the shortcomings of 
the CCMA,211  and this often compels small firms to resort to the courts first as 
opposed to the CCMA.212 Thus, it is clear that whilst the CCMA remains accepted 
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for its advantages surrounding its processes, there is a lack of uniformity in its 
effect.213 
4. CONCLUSION 
The objectives of labour dispute resolution include efficiency, accessibility 
and informality. According to Steenkamp and Bosch,214 the raison d’etre for these 
are because employers and employees cannot afford delays and they may not possess 
the necessary knowledge to tackle these lengthy legal processes.215 Further, it is 
essential for labour dispute resolution institutions to maintain a balance between the 
rights and interests of both parties while maintaining relatively healthy labour 
relations.  
The simplicity with which a party may bring a dismissal dispute to the 
CCMA as well as its high referral rate accounts for the its extensive caseload. As a 
cost-free service, the CCMA aims to provide an answer to the question of how 
labour dispute resolutions can be made accessible and efficient.216 In comparison to 
conventional litigation and court procedures, the CCMA has enjoyed a great level of 
success since its establishment, especially when resolving disputes as promptly as 
possible. This has resulted in a slight shift in the level of disputes brought by 
employees that would have otherwise not had the resources or time to carry out these 
applications.217 
The advantages of the CCMA include its lack of technicalities and 
informality in carrying out its functions. However, this approachability is 
accompanied with its flaws, as the extraordinary number of cases entered leads to a 
shortage of financial and human resources. However, the fact that the CCMA has 
limited resources at its disposal and is still able to carry out and resolve disputes 
within the time limits further highlights its success.  
This chapter outlined the successes and shortcomings associated with the 
CCMA when dealing with dismissals in comparison to conventional courts. The 
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CCMA has succeeded in providing improved and expedited access to dispute 
resolution services for employees who generally would not have otherwise had the 
means to bring legal disputes against employers’ decisions. This success can be 
attributed to numerous factors, including simplified referral forms, the absence of 
formal legal pleadings and restrictions on legal representation in dismissal 
disputes.218 Unfortunately, the CCMA's success in lowering the barriers for entry to 
dispute resolution has resulting in commissioners dealing with a considerably larger 
caseload than originally expected. Due to this, it is evident that the quality of the 
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THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM OF ENGLAND 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The use of arbitration when resolving dismissal disputes has not only been an issue 
for debate in South Africa, but in England as well. Both countries have adopted 
legislation and mechanisms to facilitate alternative dispute resolution in dismissal 
disputes. An analysis of the system of South Africa has been provided and thus, it is 
time to turn towards the jurisdiction of England. Currently, England has a twofold 
method of dealing with employment disputes: the “Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS)” for conciliation and arbitration, and adjudication by the 
Employment Tribunal (ET).219 
In the late 1950’s, dismissal disputes were governed by the British legal 
system through the common law concept of contract law.220 Due to the rise of 
growing inequalities between the “master and servant”221 relationship, the bargaining 
positions between parties were regulated in different ways. It is important to note that 
prior to the 1970’s, the United Kingdom (UK) believed in a collective “laissez-
faire”222 approach, whereby an employer and employee would interact through an 
agreement to regulate their issues. After a shift in the political environment, the 
situation evolved as the government faced immense pressure over the protection of 
employees against unfair dismissals.223 
In order to assess how far England has come since the implementation of 
these institutions, it is necessary to adopt a similar analysis as carried out in the 
previous chapters. Therefore, this chapter provides an analysis of the employment 
arbitration in England and engages in the debates about the substantive criteria and 
procedure applied during employment arbitrations.  
The first step is to summarise the history of dismissal dispute resolution in 
England. From here, an overview of the relevant governing law will be given 
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including the Industrial Relations Act of 1971,224 which was repealed by the 
Employment Protection Consolidation Act of 1987 and the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Consolidation Act (TULRCA) of 1992.225 However, for the purposes of 
this chapter, the Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act of 1999 
(ER(DRA)),226 which deals with collective bargaining and dispute resolution 
settlements, and the Employment Act of 2008 (EA)227 will be used to outline the 
dispute resolution procedure. The lack of a codified Constitution in England, as well 
as the adoption of ACAS and the discussion it raises in relation to dismissals will be 
addressed, followed by the arbitration procedure when it comes to these disputes. 
2. HISTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ENGLAND 
When the Industrial Relations Act228 came into force, it gave the employment 
tribunals jurisdiction to hear claims of unfair dismissal,229 which has since expanded 
to a broad range of employment matters. The most pressing matters that were 
presented in most of the employment tribunal applications were the unfair dismissal 
complaints.230 This was a cause of concern for the then Conservative government.231 
Additionally, an increase in the caseload of industrial tribunals and the complexity of 
the law meant that the objectives originally laid out by the tribunal were not being 
met.232  
The then Department of Employment’s Green Paper233 reviewed the 
operations of the tribunals and aimed to resolve these issues. A popular suggestion, 
which was made into reality, was the voluntary arbitration scheme as an alternative 
to employment tribunals.234 The implementation of the Woolf reforms, suggested by 
Lord Woolf, contributed to the unfair dismissal arbitral route, as it stipulated that 
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court proceedings would be a last resort when resolving disputes.235 The new 
strategy consisted of a voluntary referral to ACAS for the arbitration of unfair 
dismissal issues in order to reduce the tribunals’ caseload. With the success of this 
approach, it wasn’t long after that it was enacted in the form of the ERA of 1998.236 
It was held that the government’s role in dismissals should be limited to the 
provision of information, education and quality control.237 In 1999, this was 
discussed further in the Lord Chancellor’s Department Discussion Paper on 
alternative dispute resolution.238 This paper established that alternative dispute 
resolution was suitable in situations surrounding complex and technical issues.239 
The new section, section 212A of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 1992,240 
gave rise to the ACAS Arbitration Scheme241 which aimed to provide employers and 
employees the option of legally enforceable arbitral dispute resolution by tribunals. 
The scheme came into force in 2001, but unfortunately had little effect due to the low 
uptake by employers and employees.242  
This alarmed the government and they soon published a paper aimed at 
resolving these teething problems, which they were able to amend in the EA.243 The 
EA introduced the three-step244 statutory dispute resolution processes, which were 
made obligatory for all employers. Unfortunately, this incentive still failed to reduce 
the tribunals’ caseload and it was at this stage that the Gibbons Review 
recommended an entire repeal of statutory procedures.245 Gibbons felt the best way 
to resolve any dismissal issues was through alternative dispute resolution.246 
The use of arbitration in dismissal dispute resolution in England has been a 
matter of political and legal debate over the years. The shift from tribunals to 
alternative dispute resolution resulted in numerous significant changes in English 
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history. The government was clearly alarmed by the growing caseload upon tribunals 
and felt it was necessary to implement changes to the way in which unfair dismissals 
were resolved. The ACAS Arbitration Scheme was one of the crucial changes. In 
order to evaluate what legislation has led to certain changes, an overview of the 
statutory measures governing dispute resolution will be presented in the next section. 
3. LAWS GOVERNING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
In the previous chapters, an analysis was conducted on the ways in which relevant 
statutory instruments played a crucial role in the formation of dispute resolution laws 
in South Africa. England has a different set of instruments which have aided in 
establishing law to protect employees from unfair dismissals. It must be remembered 
that England does not hold a codified Constitution, so any search for the protection 
of employees’ rights would be in Employment law. The legislative framework aimed 
to make several amendments to the existing framework surrounding tribunal 
procedures and in doing so, offered more options for employees to resolve their 
disputes. 
3.1 Arbitration Act 1996 
Although the first Arbitration Act was enacted in 1697 and consolidated in 1889, it 
was only after the consolidation of the Arbitration Act 1950247 did the interest in 
alternative dispute resolution grow.248 In fact, this Act249 allowed international 
arbitration to form under the Geneva Convention, which was expanded to include the 
New York Convention of 1975.250 However, the main motive for arbitration as an 
alternative to dispute resolution came after the Mustill Committee enforced the 
newly formed Arbitration Act 1996.251 The Arbitration Act 1996252 was intended to 
be a comprehensive legal statement for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
providing a route for efficient and cost effective dispute resolution.253  
The Act was divided into four sections, each setting out the necessary 
schedules and principles to guide the proceedings during arbitration,254 the seat of 
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arbitration255 and other general provisions relating to arbitration.256 Since the 
enactment of the Act, there has been substantial development in the employment 
sector of the applicability of alternative dispute resolution.257 This growth in 
alternative dispute resolution led to the proposal that ACAS should implement a 
scheme specializing in unfair dismissal claims, which was enforced through the 
ER(DR)A.258 
3.2 Employment Rights Act 
As one of the first few pieces of legislation that provided dispute resolution 
regulation, this Act259 aimed to deal with collective bargaining and how to conduct 
disciplinary hearings. When it comes to dismissals, section 94260 describes that an 
employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.261 Furthermore, 
section 98 (1) (b) states that there must be a fair reason for a dismissal, which must 
be substantial or relating to “conduct, redundancy, contravention of statute…”262 
Thus, any dismissal cannot be carried out at will but rather for a reason clearly 
specified in the statute. This is necessary to balance the rights of the employer and 
the employee. However, this Act does not go into the details of what is required 
when it comes to dispute resolution. Thus, another instrument was created to specify 
the changes to the then Arbitration Act’s263 procedures. 
3.3 Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 
The ER(DR)A made several changes to employment tribunal procedures, but more 
importantly, it created a scheme for ACAS arbitration for unfair dismissal claims.264 
This act was introduced by the House of Lords with the intention of reducing the 
increasing delays caused by the employment tribunal’s high caseload.265 The main 
objective of this statute was to allow ACAS, if the parties agree, to arbitrate and hear 
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any unfair dismissal dispute.266 This is clearly outlined in section 7 of the Act,267 
whereby ACAS was encouraged to create a scheme with an alternative approach to 
the traditional employment tribunal process when it came to resolving disputes. 
Additionally, this Act enabled the Secretary of State to allow arbitration for other 
types of claims. This role is quite different compared to ACAS’s previous roles; 
however, the Act intends for ACAS to operate the new role alongside its old role of 
conciliating and settling disputes.268 
3.4 Employment Act 24 of 2008 
This Act expands on the dispute resolution procedure and the disciplinary procedure. 
This statute was originally referred to as the “Employment Simplification Bill”269, 
and the government’s intention behind this statute was to introduce a simple three-
step process that all parties in an employment dispute were bound to follow, or else 
face financial penalties if the dispute reached the tribunal.270 Unfortunately, after this 
incentive was implemented, the cracks began to show as tribunal numbers were not 
reducing.271 It was at this point that the Gibbons report272 suggested a complete 
repeal of the statutory dispute resolution procedure. 
Gibbons identified two contrasting perspectives on the statutory dismissal 
and disciplinary procedures (SDDPs). Firstly, the use of SDDPs would be beneficial 
to workplace dispute procedures because they helped promote consistency and 
fairness amongst the treatment of individuals.273 However, he felt that the SDDPs 
had failed to produce the desired outcome as there was in fact a rise in the number of 
tribunal applications.274 Gibbons said that the EA of 2002 failed to test the depths of 
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dispute resolution and that the EA of 2008 would follow suit.275 He found that there 
are more ways to encourage workplace dispute resolution that the 2008 Act does not 
include.276 
There was a general sentiment that the government should have given greater 
support to trade unions, as this would encourage an increase in internal procedures in 
unionised workplaces.277 Sanders278 reiterates that this would strengthen the fairness 
of dismissal, a point outlined in the case of Polkey,279 and limit compensatory 
reductions which would in turn incentivise employers to follow procedures.280 The 
shortcomings of the EA highlighted the need for a new arrangement when dealing 
with unfair dismissal disputes.281 
4. ACAS 
ACAS is an independent and impartial government agency that aims to improve 
industrial relationships between an employer and employee.282 As noted above, 
England’s dual employment system for unfair dismissals relies heavily on ACAS.283 
The use of ACAS remains entirely voluntary and it is according to the parties’ 
discretion should they wish to seek alternative dispute resolution.284 The institute 
charges no fees and maintains confidentiality throughout.285 Furthermore, the 
institution offers conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and ACAS remains under a 
statutory obligation to promote voluntary settlements of employment matters.286 
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An ACAS officer is to provide useful information and options to the parties 
during the arbitration process as they aim to settle outstanding issues.287 If the 
dispute remains unresolved, it will be referred to the tribunal, whereby ACAS’s 
involvement in the matter terminates.288 Aside from resolving dismissal disputes, 
ACAS is responsible for developing the Code of Practice, “The Code,” on 
interpreting dismissal legislation.289 The Code plays a significant role in setting 
benchmarks for the correct dismissal procedure and whilst it is not a binding 
instrument, the tribunals must adhere to it when addressing unfair dismissal 
claims.290 Additionally, the implementation of the ACAS Scheme provides a clear 
guideline for arbitrators when handling arbitrations, both of which will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
4.1 ACAS Scheme 
The ACAS Scheme came into force in 2001291 to allow ACAS to refer the dispute to 
an arbitrator once they agree to arbitration.292 The arbitrator does not deal with any 
disputes relating to jurisdiction or the determination of whether an individual is an 
employee or not, but rather on issues relating to dismissals only.293 The panel of 
arbitrators need not be lawyers but rather those with relevant employment relations 
experience.294 The arbitrator’s duty is to be impartial and fair, as well as to “adopt 
procedures suitable to the circumstance of the particular case.”295 During the 
arbitration proceedings, evidence will not be given on oath, the approach would be 
more inquisitorial, and the decision will be passed on to the parties only, assuring a 
level of privacy.296  
In contrast to the CCMA, ACAS does not have a review procedure for 
arbitration decisions. In fact, an arbitrator’s award can only be challenged through an 
                                                
287 Leonard Rico, “Legislating Against Unfair Dismissal: Implications from British 
Experience,” 8 Berkley. J. EMP & Lab. L. (1986) 554. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Leonard Rico, “Legislating Against Unfair Dismissal: Implications from British 
Experience,” 8 Berkley. J. EMP & Lab. L. (1986) 554. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Leonard Rico, “Legislating Against Unfair Dismissal: Implications from British 
Experience,” 8 Berkley. J. EMP & Lab. L. (1986) 554. 
292 Ibid. 
293 ACAS Arbitration Scheme 2001, p7 
294 Earnshaw J & Hardy S, “Assessing an Arbitral Route for Unfair Dismissal,” ILJ Vol 30 
(2001) 294 
295 ACAS Arbitration Scheme 2001, p 12. 




appeal based on limited circumstances.297 These circumstances are based on the 
grounds of substantive jurisdiction, serious irregularity of the arbitrators conduct in 
making the decision298 and whether there is a question of EU and Human Rights 
Law.299 Any appeals to the arbitrator’s decision would have to be made to the High 
Court.300 It is important that the parties raise their point with the arbitrator or Scheme 
during the arbitration proceedings as they may lose their right to challenge the 
decision.301  
Entry into the arbitration process is through an arbitration agreement, which 
must stipulate consent from both parties and their representatives.302 The purpose of 
the Scheme is to provide an informal and private environment into which parties may 
bring their dismissal issues, as opposed to the court. Unfortunately, as with all 
recommendations, they are prone to problems. The Scheme may prove problematic 
as there may be a risk of erratic decision-making from a single arbitrator, as opposed 
to three decision makers during a tribunal hearing.303 Furthermore, the fact that the 
arbitrator may not be a lawyer or possess the relevant legal knowledge may be a 
cause for concern, as the decision may not be legally well informed.304 The issue of 
legal representation during proceedings will be dealt with in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
4.2 ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 
Whilst the ACAS Scheme was aimed at parties resorting to arbitration when dealing 
with their matter, the question arises as to what must be followed when making the 
decision. According to the ACAS Code of Practice on “Disciplinary practice and 
procedures,” the Code was formed to be in line with the recommendations of the 
Gibbons Review,305 which would be accompanied by a comprehensive non-statutory 
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guide. The arbitrators must use The Code to determine the terms of reference and 
whether they are fair according to the laid-out provisions.306 
According to Sanders,307 the Code reiterates the standard of unreasonable 
behaviour under s 98 (4) ERA. Although the Code may have been updated, there are 
still standards that appear more lenient than those found in previous versions.308 This 
may deprive employees of their essential protections under previous ACAS Codes, 
such as the concept that the employer’s disciplinary action must be proportionate to 
the circumstances.309 
The purpose of the ACAS Code of Practice is to aid employers, employees and their 
representatives with a practical guideline to follow when handling disputes 
informally.310 The arbitrator is to make consistent reference to the Code throughout 
the arbitration hearing in order to have cognisance of the correct principles 
surrounding fairness and reasonableness.311 The Code of Practice serves as a 
reference for employers to utilise prior to taking any claims to court and 
arbitration.312 The ET and the ACAS arbitrator will take the Code into account when 
making decisions,313 however the arbitrator will not apply any legal tests or rules 
carried out by the tribunals.314 
Clearly, the legislation laid out by the English government has come a long 
way through a variety of resolutions, statutes and amendments. Whilst the ERA and 
EA aim to provide employees with protection, they fail to address alternative 
methods of dispute resolution. The creation of the ACAS Scheme alongside the 
framework of the Code proves that these instruments aim to implement dispute 
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resolution measures that adhere to the stringent principles of fairness when it comes 
to dismissals.315 
5. ARBITRATION PROCEDURE WHEN DEALING WITH DISMISSAL 
DISPUTES 
With an overview of the arbitration process complete, it is necessary to analyse the 
appropriate procedure and process when it comes to arbitration in dismissal disputes. 
The ER(DR)A316 outlines the need for a scheme relating directly to dismissal issues 
and with the ACAS Scheme in place, a coherent guideline allows the arbitrator to 
draw up practical rules and techniques on how to resolve them.317  
The Scheme is usually triggered in situations where parties to a dismissal 
claim agree in writing to use arbitration as a method of resolving the dispute. This is 
formally known as the arbitration agreement of settlement,318 and once this pre-
requisite has been fulfilled, ACAS will transfer the case to an arbitrator. It is 
important that the agreement be laid out formally319 to ensure that the parties are 
protected from being pressured into arbitration.320 Based on the matter in front of 
them, the arbitrator will expect the parties to engage fully in the process through the 
exchange of documents, witnesses and discussions.321 The arbitrator’s role will be 
inquisitorial and there will be no direct cross-examination, although questions may 
be put forward through the arbitrator.322  
Once the arbitrator has carried out the hearings and examinations, it will be 
the arbitrator’s duty to adhere to the standards set out in the ACAS Code and the 
ACAS Handbook “Discipline at Work”323 when making a decision. The standards 
are not a substantive law measure but rather in accordance with employment 
relations, which will take into account the standards and good practice of the 
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industry.324 When the decision is ready to be issued, it will be addressed to the 
parties only to allow a level of privacy, and when it comes to remedies available for 
the parties, it will be in line with the same tribunal principles and limits such as re-
instatement, re-engagement or compensation.325 
Any request for appeal will have to be sent within 28 days from the decision 
and issued as a notice to the parties and ACAS, which the court will address.326 
These cases are often very limited as an appeal can only be made in special 
circumstances.327 It is important to note that the award is made in writing, signed, 
binding and final.328 Although the process is voluntary, the awards remain 
enforceable in the High Court and County Court.329 
6. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is clear that the process of arbitration in England developed over 
time. As a process in Employment law, alternative dispute resolution is proving to be 
increasingly significant. Through the progression of its statutory instruments, the 
government is committed to implementing fairness and efficiency when it comes to 
dismissals. The main purpose of alternative dispute resolution is to reduce the need 
for litigation in a timely manner and to improve workplace communication through 
other means such as arbitration or conciliation. The fact that the alternative dispute 
resolution process is voluntary encourages applicants to come to the table on their 
own terms with the dispute being resolved confidentially and without as much 
pressure as litigation would entail.330  
If a dispute cannot be resolved, then, subject to the parties’ rights, the issue 
can be brought to the ET or court, albeit at the high price of cost and effort. The 
implementation of the arbitration scheme provides greater clarity and leads to a 
formalisation of the arbitration procedure in employment law.331 How far this has 
gone to expand and develop dispute resolution will be assessed in more detail. The 
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next chapter discusses ACAS’s success and shortcomings, as was carried out in the 






SUCCESS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF ACAS IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL 
DISPUTES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since its formation in 1972, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
“ACAS,” is the arbitration service provider in England for resolving dismissal 
disputes. ACAS aims to improve organisational performance and the working life 
relationship between the employer and employee.332 As an independent body with 
statutory responsibilities, ACAS has a broader role encompassing the prevention of 
disputes within the employment arena. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
ACAS Arbitration Scheme was established after 2001 with the goal of encouraging 
the use of alternative dispute resolution. Despite the crucial part tribunals play within 
the employment system, they lacked accessibility and informality when resolving 
disputes. These inefficiencies were compounded by the substantial increase in the 
number of claims.333 Thus, reform of the current dispute resolution system was 
necessary as new disciplinary grievance procedures were implemented under ACAS.  
As carried out in the previous chapter with the CCMA, an analysis of the 
successes and shortcomings of ACAS in resolving dismissal disputes will be 
conducted. By evaluating each institution using a similar approach, a comparison as 
to how far each organisation has gone to meet their goals can be drawn. This will 
indicate whether each foundation is successfully carrying out their tasks.  
Firstly, an analysis of the successes ACAS has maintained by reforming the 
tribunal system will be conducted. This will be carried out by drawing information 
from the Annual Report334 of ACAS and looking at the changes that have been made 
to employment dispute resolution in more detail. 
Secondly, the chapter will outline the pitfalls of ACAS and whether it has 
managed to create a coherent system of dispute resolution. Additionally, whether the 
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implementation of ACAS has aided in substantially reducing the unfair dismissal 
claims over the last decade will be considered. As laid out in the Donovan 
Commission (1965-8),335 the aim of reforming the tribunal service was to provide an 
“accessible, speedy, informal and inexpensive”336 means of dispute resolution. 
Analysing the above mentioned factors will give a clear indication whether the 
ACAS Arbitration Scheme and the organisation has managed to adopt the mission 
originally laid out by the Donovan recommendations.337 
2. SUCCESSES OF ACAS IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL DISPUTES 
2.1 Efficiency 
In labour disputes, speedy resolution is often desirable to reach a settlement 
or to reduce any claims that are brought before a tribunal. According to the ACAS 
Annual Report of 2016,338 the highest number of claims are derived from unfair 
dismissal disputes, with the largest number of reported cases in comparison to other 
types of dispute claims.339 The Employment Tribunal (ET) aims to hear a claim 
within 26 weeks from when it was brought,340 which can often be a strenuous delay 
for someone wishing to be reinstated or granted compensation. The delays and issues 
arising from the tribunal system may be caused by the technicalities, complexities 
and the lack of resources to resolve the matter, which are, unfortunately, revealed 
only after the initial hearing.341 
ACAS has proved successful in resolving these issues expeditiously by 
allowing parties to the dispute to develop and control the resolution procedures with 
conciliation as a first resort.342 ACAS is under a statutory obligation under section 18 
and 18C of the Employment Tribunals Act (ETA)343 to get involved once a claim 
involving dismissals has been lodged. ACAS’s results prove that the organisation has 
been able to resolve a higher proportion of disputes through conciliation rather than 
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arbitration,344 but despite this, there may be some instances whereby arbitration is a 
more appropriate way to resolve a dispute. 
ACAS can arrange for arbitration to take place within three weeks after 
clearer terms of reference have been established.345 According to the ACAS 
Arbitration Scheme, an unfair dismissal hearing aims to take half the time346 as the 
ET. In fact, when the arbitrator completes an award, it is required that the award be 
simultaneously issued to both parties within three weeks after the award has been 
signed by the arbitrator.347 If there are any complaints or queries relating to the 
arbitration award, ACAS ensures that they do not interfere with the award, thus 
preserving the independence of the arbitrators from the institution.348  
2.2 Accessibility 
Any person should have the right to access dispute resolution services and 
there should be no prejudicial restrictions. ACAS has proven successful as most 
parties express contentment with the service as well as the expeditiousness with 
which it deals with claims.349 In fact, ACAS processed 77 per cent of the cases on the 
ET’s list,350 thus saving many parties a significant amount of time and distress. This 
success can be attributed to ACAS’s accessibility in resolving claims before 
resorting to tribunals. Accessibility proves useless if it does not provide a route to 
justice for its parties. ACAS has offices situated around the English region including 
Scotland and Wales, as the CCMA has offices situated around South Africa. Once an 
arbitrator has been selected, the location of the arbitration is at the discretion of the 
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parties.351 Additionally, ACAS arbitrators originate from a diverse range of 
backgrounds with an extensive breadth of experience.352 
In terms of legal representation, parties are free to seek aid in presenting their 
case, but lawyers will receive no special treatment, and this means that any 
technicalities such as swearing on oath or examination of witnesses are removed.353 
Although there will be no cross-examining, the arbitrator is free to address any 
questions to those representing the party and their witnesses, as outlined in the 
ACAS Arbitration Scheme.354 Under Rule 25 of the CCMA, legal representation is 
permitted in situations where the parties have given consent or the commissioner 
concludes it is unreasonable to deal with the dispute without representation.355 
ACAS arbitration is free to its users, and likewise, the CCMA provides the 
same sort of inexpensive service.356 The fact that ACAS provides a free alternative 
dispute resolution service before the claim reaches a tribunal gives employees a 
greater incentive for its use. In fact, from 2014 to 2016, there was a significant 
increase in case referrals to arbitration.357 More specifically, the Annual Report of 
2016358 shows how successful ACAS has been in processing dismissal disputes 
before reaching the ET.359 Another advantage of ACAS is shown through the 
accessibility of their advisory services such as call lines or online sessions. The most 
recent report360 suggests that most voice calls received by the institute relate to 
discipline and dismissal matters.361 This additional means of contacting ACAS 
                                                
351 ACAS Arbitration Scheme (England and Wales) Order 2001, SI 2001/1185 p26. 
352 Sen Amit, “The Role of Acas in dispute resolution,” < 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/8/p/The_role_of_Acas_in_dispute_resolution.pdf> last 
accessed 5th January 2018 p17-18. 
353 ACAS Arbitration Scheme (England and Wales) Order 2001, SI 2001/1185 p17. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Rule 25, Rules for the conduct of proceedings before the CCMA GNR 1448 GG 25515 of 
10 October 2003 (‘the CCMA Rules’). 
356 Sen Amit, “The Role of Acas in dispute resolution,” < 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/8/p/The_role_of_Acas_in_dispute_resolution.pdf> last 
accessed 5th January 2018 p17-18. 
357 ACAS. 2016/2017 Annual Report and Accounts, Government Publication available at < 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/e/s/Acas-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf> last accessed 10 
January 2018 p35. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Ibid. 
360 ACAS. 2016/2017 Annual Report and Accounts, Government Publication available at < 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/e/s/Acas-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf> last accessed 10 
January 2018. 
361 ACAS. 2016/2017 Annual Report and Accounts, Government Publication available at < 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/e/s/Acas-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf> last accessed 10 




proves how accessible the organisation is, but it must be borne in mind that the 
institute cannot be considered a great virtue to society unless it provides some means 
of justice to the parties.362 
2.3 Informality  
Tribunals must ensure that legal precedents are upheld and legal procedures are 
followed throughout any proceedings.363 ETs have to portray the same formalities 
and legalisms adopted in the courts.364 ACAS aims to reduce these formalities by 
making the process voluntary on the parties.365 Any arbitration carried out by ACAS 
is binding in court and the fact that the process is free portrays a contrast to the 
ET.366 
The procedural requirement for parties that have undergone conciliation and 
still wish to resolve their claim through ACAS consists only of a waiver of their 
rights to have the issue heard at a tribunal.367 At this point, two ET forms are signed 
and submitted to the tribunal, and the ACAS Arbitration Scheme will apply from the 
moment the arbitration agreement is accepted.368 As with the CCMA, there is 
flexibility in the ACAS process as the arbitration itself is carried out using a mix of 
an adversarial and inquisitorial approach, as opposed to the legalistic manner in 
which tribunals operate.369 One of the main benefits of ACAS arbitration is the 
privacy in which the hearings are held. The institute’s commitment to confidentiality 
is a contrast to tribunal proceedings as the parties’ hearings are more privately 
located.370 
Another attraction of ACAS is the fact that the arbitration remedies available 
provide the same scope of service as tribunals without the tedious technicalities. 
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Arbitration through ACAS aims to be a final recourse and attempts to bar any 
chances of the parties challenging the award.371 Therefore, the arbitrator must be able 
to view the issue with impartiality and must possess an extensive background in and 
knowledge on employment dispute resolution.372 The arbitrator is free to ask 
questions and there is no necessity for questioning or presentations by the parties. 
The informality of the arbitration procedure allows the parties to express their case 
without the complexities associated with tribunals.373 
3. SHORTCOMINGS OF ACAS IN RESOLVING DISMISSAL DISPUTES 
3.1 Efficiency 
Even though ACAS has proven itself as an institution of guidance in and 
knowledge of employment claims, there are still deficiencies within its system that 
require attention. When comparing the tribunal process and the ACAS process for 
arbitration, it is clear that any claim made to a tribunal is “direct,” whereas access to 
arbitration is only permitted once a settlement agreement or arbitration agreement 
through ACAS has been signed.374 Even though ACAS aims to hear the issue within 
two months, the need for an arbitration agreement may slow down the process and 
hence, this service may be even slower than the tribunal route in many regions.375  
Whilst every effort has been made in the arbitration scheme to adhere to time 
limits, it is difficult to expect the institution to meet these targets without 
experiencing problems. ACAS’s scheme stipulates that the agreement to submit to 
arbitration must be made within six weeks.376 At this point parties only have two 
routes to arbitration: through a compromise agreement, or a COT3 form, which 
records ACAS settlements between the parties to settle actual or potential complaints 
to the Employment Tribunal.377 Unfortunately, these complexities make it more 
difficult to determine whether a hearing will be quicker than resorting to a tribunal 
system.378  
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Every case is different and with the cooperation of all the parties involved, 
ACAS strives to conduct hearings within four weeks of, but no later than eight weeks 
from, the time of referral.379 Although the arbitrator can determine the venue and 
date, it can only occur eight weeks after ACSA has been notified of the arbitration 
agreements.380 Additionally, although the arbitrator will only have one matter to deal 
with, there is a likelihood that a hearing will not be completed within the time and 
the award will take much longer as it is presented in writing at a much later date.381 
In contrast, a tribunal’s decision can be presented at the hearing or it can be 
adjourned for a later time when the tribunal feels it is equitable to do so.382 The date 
is flexible as the decision can be made on the same day but it is estimated that 
decisions are handed down approximately within two months.383  
Based on the most recently published Annual Report of 2016-2017,384 the 
number of cases referred to arbitration has reduced compared to the previous two 
years.385 This can be attributed to the fact that people are unaware of the process or 
they find it senseless to resort to arbitration when they could receive a decision 
quicker by filing a claim through an ET. Another issue of ACAS when it comes to 
efficiency is the fact that due to this aim of “finality”, appeals are only allowed for 
certain points of law relating to Human Rights or EU law.386 In fact, issues that an 
arbitrator may deal with are limited and if any issue is beyond the scope of their 
knowledge, a legal advisor may be required to guide the arbitrator.387  
3.2 Accessibility 
Although arbitration may seem more attractive than adjudication, it should be noted 
that many are unaware of what arbitration is. When arbitration was introduced 
initially, surveys were conducted and found that only 35 per cent of respondents 
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knew what it was or had experience with it.388 Although arbitration through ACAS 
appears to be a cheaper route compared to going through a tribunal, the courts have 
recently overturned the requirement of tribunal fees.389 In the case of R (UNISON) v 
Lord Chancellor,390 the courts held that fees for ET are unlawful because they 
impede access to justice and defy the rule of law.391 This means that employees may 
not even feel the need to go through arbitration as they can easily seek justice 
through the tribunals. Although conciliation through ACAS remains a requisite, 
unfortunately, arbitration still remains voluntary.392  
The expense of running ACAS procedures also adds a significant amount of 
cost to the entire arbitration process for the state. Based on the Annual Report,393 it 
costs approximately £2 242 to hold an arbitration hearing, and although this figure 
has reduced in comparison to the previous year, it is still the highest billing service 
compared to conciliation or telephone guidance.394 Since ACAS arbitrators are not 
employed, they are usually appointed on a case-by-case basis with an estimated 
number of around 100 arbitrators under the scheme.395 Thus, an increase in resources 
would be highly beneficial especially when it comes to the number of arbitrators 
available. Furthermore, the fact that there is one arbitrator as opposed to the 
tribunal’s panel of three may also prove controversial as the decision making may be 
biased, and with no right of appeal, it is difficult for applicants to seek fairness in 
their dismissal claim.396 
3.3 Informality  
The purpose of an informal approach when resolving disputes through 
alternative dispute resolution is to reduce technicalities whilst maintaining the rule of 
law. An arbitration hearing will be structured according to the Arbitration Scheme 
despite being an informal process. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the absence 
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of lawyers may be seen as a reduction in expense for applicants. However, a lawyer’s 
presence makes a significant difference as they define the issues but also assist in 
hearings by facilitating a settlement.397 However, the fact that the arbitration process 
often follows an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial approach discourages lawyers 
from participating in these hearings.398  
The fact that arbitration provides the same remedies as that of ET proves 
attractive to its users. However, the fact that arbitrators do not provide reasons for the 
award makes it harder for an applicant to appeal the decision or engage with the 
actual dispute.399 ACAS aims to uphold the procedures followed by tribunals, but 
arbitrators are discouraged from providing recommendations or straying into 
“unknown territory”400 as this could potentially lengthen the dispute.401  
The choice of arbitrator is one of the most important decisions for ACAS to 
make. As mentioned previously, the arbitrator is not an employee of ACAS, but a 
third party agent.402 Brown403 comments that it is essential for an arbitrator to have 
experience in settling disputes by arbitration and that 88.9 per cent of the respondents 
in her survey emphasised this importance.404 Additionally, her research showed that 
the majority of the applicants that used the ACAS arbitration process felt their 
arbitrators lacked sufficient understanding of the procedures405 and that the arbitrator 
was sympathetic towards the “underdog” in the situation.406 This point in particular 
proves that ACAS needs to recruit adequately qualified arbitrators with the relevant 
knowledge and independence to hear a case. 
In the ET system, there is a high charge for legalism.407 It is difficult not to 
follow a legal approach when it comes areas of law such as unfair dismissals, which 
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require adherence to the prescribed legislation.408 The Arbitration Scheme aims to 
avoid legalism through limiting the enquiry to the main issue: the fairness of the 
dismissal.409 However, if there are issues of EU or Human Rights Law, legalism will 
be inevitable.410 Furthermore, when addressing the issue of fairness, arbitrators rely 
on the knowledge of previous cases they have dealt with. This may create contention 
as arbitration is held privately so there is no clear-cut way of knowing the standards 
to which an employer should adhere.411  
Additionally, an employer may be unaware of how the dismissal claim will 
be explored by the arbitrator and what conditions to follow before the claim is 
brought to arbitration.412 This means ACAS may have to intervene at certain points 
with the arbitration to ensure consistency, which conflicts with ACAS’s aim to 
preserve the independence and integrity of an arbitrator’s decision.413 
4. CONCLUSION 
According to Lewis and Clark,414 the purpose of arbitration is to serve as a 
“cheaper, informal and more accessible”415 form of dispute resolution that offers a 
more flexible range of remedies.416 The concept of arbitration was introduced into 
the British system in the early 1970’s.417 The creation of ACAS as an alternative 
dispute resolution centre for unfair dismissal claims proves successful in its goal to 
reduce the caseload of tribunals. There is arguably no doubt that the successes 
discussed in this chapter prove that the implementation of an arbitration scheme 
provides a critical and useful service to the employment system. 
The simplicity and efficiency of arbitration procedures reassures applicants 
that the process will be less daunting and technical. There are similar remedies 
applied in tribunals, which are offered to those who undertake arbitration. The 
purpose is to mirror the principles and awards that a tribunal could offer without the 
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associated complexities and delays. Confidentiality is key, and whilst some may feel 
deterred, others prefer the privacy with which one is able to have one’s case heard 
and dealt with. The Donovan ideals418 appeared to have fallen through the cracks 
when it comes to the tribunal’s ability to resolve dismissal claims, and although 
arbitration is not entirely successful in upholding those ideals, the use of ACAS and 
its arbitration scheme is a step in the right direction. 
Unfortunately, the use of arbitration to resolve dismissal disputes is still a 
developing process, which in the last year failed to appear more attractive than 
conciliation.419 The fact that the Arbitration Scheme provides no right to appeal 
proves contentious, as most applicants do not receive any reasons as to why a certain 
decision is made.420 As opposed to the CCMA that provides reasons for its decisions, 
an applicant is left in the dark, as the decision an ACAS arbitrator makes is final.421 
The disappointing amount of cases referred to arbitration in the recent annual 
report422 leads to the question of whether enough information about arbitration and 
its use has been marketed to the public.  
Despite some of the disappointments the Arbitration Scheme lays out, it is 
clear that its implementation has been welcome, as it has still proved to be a swifter 
means of dispute resolution in a coherent and concise way.423 The speediness in 
which disputes are dealt with, the flexible nature of proceedings and the privacy in 
which the hearings are held are appealing to applicants over the tribunal system.424 
Despite the fact that many applicants view arbitration as a last resort, many 
experienced representatives would encourage the use of ACAS arbitration at first 
instance in specific cases.425 
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This chapter consolidated the use of ACAS and its Arbitration Scheme for 
resolving disputes in an accessible, informal and expeditious manner. Despite the 
system’s numerous benefits, there is still room for improvement. Inspiration for 
developments can be derived from the likes of the CCMA. To address how ACAS 
can overcome its obstacles and build on its successes, the next chapter will analyse 
the way in which the CCMA and ACAS can benefit from one another as institutions 
















THE CCMA & ACAS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, an efficient, accessible and informal dispute 
resolution institution is an essential part of a well-functioning employment law 
system. In the previous chapters, the strengths and weaknesses of the public 
arbitration processes in South Africa and England were analysed.  Both countries’ 
systems are subject to their own unique limitations and setbacks, which could partly 
be resolved by each system learning from the other. Thus, this chapter aims to 
establish recommendations from both systems. 
To do this, a comparative analysis will be carried out exploring the pitfalls of 
the CCMA and ACAS. Whilst there are key differences between each country’s 
legislation, their dispute resolution techniques are similar, making a comparative 
analysis possible. By means of this comparison, an in-depth investigation into the 
challenges these systems face during dismissal disputes resolution by arbitration can 
be undertaken. Finally, a number of recommendations will be proposed which the 
CCMA and ACAS could implement to make internal improvements. 
2. PITFALLS OF THE CCMA: WHAT CAN BE LEARNT FROM ACAS? 
Despite the benefits of the CCMA in delivering expeditious, accessible and flexible 
dispute resolution when compared to the courts, there are a number of challenges the 
institution faces which may be detrimental to its success. As mentioned in chapter 
three, the increasing caseload of arbitrations in the CCMA makes it difficult for the 
institution to function efficiently.426 The CCMA still has to issue an award with 
reasons within 14 days from when the proceedings were concluded.427 Unfortunately, 
with the limited resources to hear arbitration matters, the CCMA is overburdened 
and thus problems may and do arise. Furthermore, the strict deadlines set out by the 
CCMA428 fail to take into account the CCMA’s shortage of arbitrators, thus 
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potentially resulting in more delays.429 It has also been reported that inappropriate 
pressure has at times been placed on the parties to settle their disputes by CCMA 
commissioners seeking to save time and meet their targets.430 
ACAS provides a wide variety of resources to the public for dealing with 
dismissals by means of arbitration. ACAS arbitration hearings tend to take place 
within two months after the arbitration agreement has been processed and 
submitted.431 ACAS awards as usually issued to both parties within 21 days of the 
award having been certified by the arbitrator.432As with the CCMA, ACAS offers 
services through their telephone helplines, where the majority of the caseload 
concerns dismissal disputes.433 This system has proved successful over the years in 
resolving disputes expeditiously. The CCMA can mitigate the effects of an 
increasing caseload by hiring third party agencies in the way ACAS has. ACAS 
arbitrators are not commissioners of the agency, and the separation of these powers 
could enable the CCMA to hire third party agencies to handle disputes which are less 
demanding. This will allow CCMA commissioners to give more attention to and 
spend more time on dismissals. Unfortunately, this will require more funding and 
therefore, it is suggested that there be an active lobby to the government to provide 
adequate funding to handle the increasing caseload. This may require due diligence 
into CCMA internal policies to allow for an increase in budget.  
It is argued by Benjamin434 that there is doubt surrounding the CCMA’s 
arbitration efficiency as the institution has been criticised for being inconsistent in 
making decisions. It is important for the CCMA to keep consistent in their approach 
in order to create a guideline for future disputes. Furthermore, Benjamin435 states that 
the CCMA is outdated in its approach to procedural fairness.436 The labour landscape 
is constantly changing and labour law requires amendments to stay updated, 
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particularly when it comes to the Codes of Good Practice437 and guidelines for small 
businesses in employment disputes.438 Therefore, by aligning their approach with the 
most recent judicial standards while keeping their users aware of the changes, there 
may be a significant reduction in review cases. 
The LRA affords commissioners discretion as to whether arbitrations are 
conducted in an adversarial or inquisitorial manner (or a combination of the two) 
within the parameters of the Act.439 Clark440 notes that although discretion given to 
the commissioner may appear investigative, the arbitration proceedings are often 
adversarial.441 Therefore, arbitrators using an inquisitorial approach must ensure the 
parties can exercise their rights under s 138.442 However, the CCMA Guidelines on 
Misconduct Arbitrations443 specify in detail how the arbitrator should conduct 
hearings. These guidelines appear to undermine s 138 of the LRA444 as well as the 
commissioner’s discretion in conducting arbitrations. Even though arbitrations are to 
be carried out with flexibility, it is clear that regardless of how the misconduct 
arbitration is conducted, the arbitrators have limited autonomy in their decision 
making and they have to take into account the CCMA guidelines.445  
The guidelines lay out the format of how arbitrators are to carry out the 
hearings and the rights of parties in proceedings.446 Parties are given the opportunity 
to call witnesses and give evidence,447 regardless of the approach the arbitrator has 
adopted in proceedings.448 This confines the powers of commissioners as they are 
still required to secure the parties’ rights despite their preference of approach during 
arbitration proceedings. This ambiguity may lead to inconsistencies in how 
proceedings are carried out during CCMA arbitrations. This goes against the whole 
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purpose of public arbitration, which is to reduce formalities such as representation 
and other legalisms.  
Alternatively, ACAS predominantly adopts an inquisitorial approach which 
tends to gives its users confidence before the actual hearing in two ways.449 Firstly, 
ACAS ensures that there have been formal dispute resolution attempts, such as 
mediation or internal appeals.450 Secondly, an arbitration agreement is sent to the 
arbitrator stipulating that the parties have agreed to arbitration, together with their 
terms of reference.451 This proves advantages as it sets out what the parties aim to 
achieve, which could contribute to a more focused and efficient dispute resolution 
process. Although the CCMA provides compulsory conciliation prior to arbitration, 
there is no formal agreement which outlines the parties’ objectives, like the 
arbitration agreements drawn up by ACAS applicants. It may happen that 
participants in the arbitration process are largely unaware of what they are aiming to 
achieve. In the ACAS system, should there be a change in circumstance, the agreed 
terms of reference take precedence.452  
Whilst an adversarial approach may seem appropriate for some matters, an 
inquisitorial approach may be more appropriate for others.453 All in all, it seems 
beneficial for the CCMA to establish a form of agreement before commencing any 
procedures so that the parties are aware of their goals. It will also allow the arbitrator 
to remain focused on these goals should there be any disturbance during the 
proceedings.  
Another advantage ACAS arbitrations have over that of the CCMA is 
confidentiality. Although both institutes remain publicly available, the nature in 
which the arbitrations are conducted differ, as ACAS remains more private by 
keeping the location of arbitration and the arbitrator confidential. The CCMA’s 
hearings are held in public institutions with less confidentiality as to the location and 
arbitrator. When the CCMA makes an award, they are published and reported,454 
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which is available for public access. Whilst this may improve consistency in decision 
making, it can reduce the privacy of the parties. Therefore, if the parties were given 
the autonomy to decide where the arbitration is going to be held, it could provide the 
parties with more control over how intimate and private the arbitration will be. 
3. PITFALLS OF ACAS: WHAT CAN BE LEARNT FROM THE CCMA? 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, ACAS provides a substantial level of support 
for arbitration as a method for alternative dispute resolution. However, there remains 
concern over their arbitration procedures during dismissal dispute resolution. One of 
the most prominent issues of ACAS is the fact that using their services is 
voluntary.455 In England, most disputes concerning individual employment rights are 
resolved voluntarily through internal procedures within the business.456 If this fails to 
produce positive results, the employee has a legal right to take the case to an 
Employment Tribunal, but not to arbitration, as it can only be resorted to with the 
consent of both parties and once all internal procedures and conciliation processes 
have been exhausted.457 There is therefore less incentive for the parties to refer their 
disputes to ACAS for arbitration. In contrast, the CCMA makes conciliation and 
arbitration compulsory458 for employees seeking to challenge their dismissals in an 
external forum.  
Although arbitration decisions for individual disputes are binding, the 
decisions around collective arbitration cases made by an ACAS arbitrator are only 
binding in “honour.”459 This may prove problematic for other types of cases, as the 
parties are not obliged to follow the decision or refer the matter to court for further 
resolution. The Annual Report of ACAS 2016-2017460 shows the reduced number of 
arbitrations as a method of resolution as opposed to conciliation and mediation.461 
On the other hand, the CCMA’s decisions are binding and enforceable,462 and 
therefore parties take proceedings more seriously. If ACAS adopted this approach to 
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all arbitration claims and not just individual cases, their independence as an 
institution in resolving dismissal disputes would be further recognised by the courts 
and the public. This could also result in a higher number of cases resolved through 
arbitration as people would view ACAS arbitration as an enforceable route when 
solving dismissal issues. 
Another issue apparent in the ACAS arbitration procedure is the absence of a 
requirement to provide reasons for an award. The arbitrator is under no obligation to 
provide reasons for their award,463 which is problematic, as ACAS users are unable 
to pin point why a particular award was issued. In fact, ACAS refrains from 
interfering with the decision making process by not giving recommendations to an 
arbitrator in order to maintain their independence.464 On the other hand, the CCMA 
provides reasons for their awards465 and even though an appeal cannot be held based 
on the arbitrator’s reasons, clarity is provided to the parties in a similar manner to 
how courts would hand down a judgment as well as the option of a review, if 
necessary. 
A fundamental flaw in the ACAS arbitration process is its lack of an 
appropriate review system. If an applicant is unhappy with the arbitrator’s award, 
they may only appeal this decision in limited circumstances including where there is 
an issue concerning EU law or the Human Rights Act, the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, or 
where there is an allegation of a serious irregularity in the arbitrator’s conduct.466 As 
the appeal must to be made to the High Court or County Court,467 it places the 
applicant under the scrutiny of the same legalism they aimed to avoid in the first 
place. Without any reasons provided for the award, parties may be left resorting to 
the appeal process since they are unlikely to obtain clarity on the decision.  
On the other hand, the LRA outlines the principles governing review 
proceedings under s 145,468 whereby the court is primarily required to examine how 
the decision was made, rather than the merits of the case. However, since the case of 
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Sidumo,469 read with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Herholdt,470 this 
section has been said to be suffused by the requirement of reasonableness. In 
Sidumo,471 the Constitutional Court held that arbitration awards must be reviewed 
under s 145. This section has been pervaded by section 33 of the Constitution 
governing the right to just administrative action. Thus, in order for a CCMA award to 
be set aside, the applicant must show that the commissioner’s decision was 
unreasonable. Furthermore, in terms of section 33 of the Constitution,472 in South 
Africa the provision of reasons is an essential aspect of the review process, as it 
assists a court to establish whether the decision of the lower court or tribunal 
complies with the requirements of lawfulness, procedural fairness and 
reasonableness.473 If ACAS is able to implement a separate review process, the court 
will be able to focus on these matters specifically rather than to allow the claim to go 
under the guise of an appeal. 
Unfortunately, there has been a reduction in arbitration dismissal cases in the 
last year474 due to the fact that most ACAS applicants are unaware of arbitration as 
opposed to the other services. In fact, according to the most recent report,475 the 
majority of ACAS cases are processed through conciliation.476 It is clear that there 
needs to be more awareness of the services provided by ACAS, especially 
arbitration. The CCMA conducts outreach visits to areas of South Africa, provides 
free explanatory leaflets to potential applicants, and conducts workshops for those 
employers or employees in need of dispute resolution.477 It is recommended that 
ACAS increase the marketing of their services and educate the public on the 
procedures for arbitrations. 
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Despite the abovementioned ways in which each institute can learn from the other to 
resolve deficiencies, there are circumstances whereby a solution remains to be found. 
This section provides recommendations which ACAS and the CCMA could follow 
to resolve these residual shortcomings within their systems. 
4.1 CCMA 
Whilst the referral process during conciliation and arbitration remains simple, it is 
the actual procedure which may appear more technical to users.478 Benjamin479 
discusses how a lack of representation may prove problematic during arbitration 
hearings.480 Although representation is allowed in limited circumstances, it remains a 
highly contested issue. On the one hand, the use of lawyers could increase the 
technicalities of the arbitration, and on the other hand, it may aid the parties in 
understanding the issues in the dispute.  
It is recommended that the CCMA place restrictions on the type of 
representation, and for what purpose they may be allowed, into the hearing. For 
example, the CCMA can encourage legal representatives to support the need for 
disputes to be expeditiously resolved as opposed to extending the formalities of the 
process. Commissioners can consult the party’s representation to establish timeous 
targets and set out their role in proceedings beforehand as a means of simplifying the 
arbitration process. Where there is any risk of the representation becoming too 
formal in their approach, the CCMA should intervene to ensure there remains a level 
of informality. Furthermore, a survey could be carried out whereby applicants 
provide feedback as to how the CCMA could simplify its arbitration process and 
whether the use of representation in certain cases has led to complications. 
Additionally, there remains criticism of the approach with which the judicial 
reviews are carried out. To reiterate what has been stated in the previous chapter, 
courts are required to look beyond the procedures when undertaking reviews of 
CCMA awards, notwithstanding section 145 of the LRA; in fact, since Sidumo,481 
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they have engaged with the merits too. This has arguably contributed to the number 
of arbitration awards that are taken on review to the Labour Court, with a detrimental 
impact on efficiency, informality, accessibility and finality. 
Initially, arbitration hearings were not recorded and reviews would be based 
on the parties’ submissions and the arbitrator’s notes. However, the courts insisted 
that a full record be maintained, which has led to complexities and delays when 
hearing reviews.482 However, Benjamin483 argues that it would be beneficial if there 
were an appeal process that would allow the governing body to determine the 
fairness of the employer’s decision, rather than the fairness of the way in which the 
arbitrator exercised his decision.484 He further argues that this suggestion could serve 
as a guideline for arbitrators with a body of precedent that could provide clarity on 
dismissal disputes.485 
4.2 ACAS 
For there to be a significant difference when resolving dismissal disputes through 
public arbitration and the ET compared to conventional methods, there must be 
incentives for an applicant to pursue this route. Despite ACAS’s attempt to maintain 
strict deadlines in bringing a dismissal claim, it has proven difficult to reach these 
targets based on the formal legalities required. This includes brief written statements 
of the case, an arbitration agreement stipulating the parties’ consent to using 
arbitration, as well as other supporting documents outlining their objectives and 
procedures.486  
These legal documents must be sent 7 days in advance, and whilst this 
remains fundamental for the arbitrator (so that he or she can understand the 
objectives of the parties), it may appear too legalistic for the applicants and thus 
deter them from applying based on the difficulty of formalising these documents 
before a hearing. A suggested way around this issue would be for the parties and 
arbitrator to discuss and sign the arbitration agreement prior to the actual hearing.  
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This will give the more vulnerable and less empowered employees a better chance of 
a fair agreement with input from a third party with expertise in the field. 
Additionally, surveys could be conducted to find out whether the parties to a claim 
would prefer fewer technicalities when coming to arbitration and how this would 
benefit their needs. Delays and time restrictions in the arbitration process are issues 
which both the ACAS and the CCMA face, and this will be dealt with in more detail 
below. 
The abolishment of tribunal fees when it comes to employment disputes in 
England487 may pose a threat to the arbitration system. Parties may feel inclined to 
use the ET, as their decisions would be enforceable and they would be provided with 
a legal route to justice without cost. Although the success of this change remains to 
be seen, it would require ACAS to reduce their formalities significantly to show the 
advantages users may enjoy in pursuing arbitration such as fairness and an 
alternative route to dispute resolution. It is recommended that ACAS make 
arbitration an obligatory route as they have with conciliation. Based on how the 
CCMA operates and its experience in this regard, this will reduce the number of 
trivial matters reaching the tribunal and will likely improve the credibility that ACAS 
might enjoy. 
In the last chapter, it was shown that most arbitration users fail to be satisfied 
with their arbitrator and this may contribute to the low use of arbitration488 as a 
means to resolve dismissal disputes. Additionally, as with the CCMA,489 parties may 
be more encouraged to accept an arbitrator’s decision if they are provided with the 
reasons why he or she made the decision they did. In order to refrain from resorting 
to a legal advisor and increasing the costs of arbitration, it is suggested that 
arbitrators with the relevant knowledge are selected to hear the relevant cases. 
Brown’s490 research indicates that the qualities parties consider important for an 
arbitrator are impartiality and experience in the matter before a hearing.491 Therefore, 
it would be appropriate for ACAS to hold workshops and conduct training for 
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arbitrators to reduce the need for legal advisors and prevent ACAS from interfering 
with their decisions. 
5. THE CCMA AND ACAS  
Despite both organisations displaying flaws, their benefit to society is the main 
reason why the need for constant improvement is necessary. The CCMA and ACAS 
both suffer from delays in decision-making and processing time. It is recommended 
that both institutes implement an updated quality control system for dismissal dispute 
resolution. Although the CCMA has a case management system, there is still room 
for improvement. A quality management system could promote improvement in 
areas of expeditiousness, client interaction and arbitration quality. Research can be 
carried out on how effectively dismissal claims are dealt with, whether clients are 
having their demands met and how successful the arbitrator was in carrying out the 
proceedings in the least legalistic way. Results from this research could provide 
valuable insight on how to tackle each of these issues. 
Client surveys may enable the institutions to assess whether the clients’ needs 
are being met, and this will aid the institutions in meeting targets. Emphasis should 
be placed on a reduction in replicating court procedures, and incorporating 
techniques that allow users to easily access these systems without any additional 
formalities.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Based on the examination of both institutions, it is plain that the pitfalls of one 
system could be mitigated by learning from the successes of the other. Labour 
arbitration is a form of dispute resolution that will require continuous research and 
development into the way processes are carried out. The challenges the CCMA and 
ACAS face are issues that require feedback from users, such that an overall 
improvement of their management can occur. The purpose of arbitration in dismissal 
matters is to provide an alternative route for applicants to seek resolution. The 
recommendations provided in this chapter aim not only to seek solutions for the 
organisations, but also to draw a comparison between ACAS and the CCMA. By 
each institution learning from one another, they could enhance their arbitration 
processes in a way that proves tantamount to the original objectives set out by the 






The purpose of this dissertation was to ascertain whether the use of public arbitration 
in South Africa is meeting its objectives of providing swift and accessible dismissal 
dispute resolution. The progress of the CCMA in resolving dismissal disputes was 
evaluated according to these performance measurements. As mentioned in chapter 
one, the increase in dismissal disputes led to the requirement for alternative dispute 
resolution systems. These systems were necessary to provide users with an avenue to 
avoid the frustrations that accompanied court litigation. This topic was examined 
through a comparative study between England and South Africa, due to their similar 
approaches in using public arbitration to resolve dismissal disputes.  
Throughout the dissertation, the elements of efficiency, accessibility and 
formality were considered with respect to the two countries and their public 
arbitration institutions. The second chapter addressed how the history of South 
Africa played a prominent role in shaping the way the country handled disputes. 
Following a political shift, the LRA492 came into effect with the notion of 
simplifying the resolution procedures. The chapter also examined how the CCMA 
was formed in order to fulfil some of the LRA’s main aims of promoting social 
justice and the efficient resolution of labour disputes. Supported and informed by the 
LRA493 and the Code of Good Practice,494 the CCMA was able to operate in a 
manner that adheres to the legislation whilst simultaneously making independent 
decisions. In this way, its independence as an administrative body whose arbitration 
decisions remained final was recognised.495   
Chapter three expanded on the powers of the CCMA and noted how far it was 
able to balance the needs of the parties to a dismissal dispute in a manner which 
differed from formal court procedures. This was proven to be largely successful 
based on the CCMA’s high referral rate,496 and that the CCMA aims to have the 
arbitration awards issued within 14 days from the conclusion of the proceedings.497 
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The shortcomings of the CCMA were addressed, and it was clear that the lack of 
human and financial resources coupled with a greater increase in caseload has left 
arbitrators under immense pressure to resolve disputes quickly and effectively.  
It is at this point that the comparative study shifted towards the English 
dispute resolution system. The notable differences between South Africa and 
England legislation were discussed, as the UK continues to be regulated without a 
Constitution. Despite this distinction, from an examination of the English history of 
dispute resolution, an underlying argument was found, calling for increased 
alternative dispute mechanisms to resolve disputes through means other than 
tribunals. Acts, such as the Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act498 and the 
Employment Act of 2008,499 played a crucial role in developing the English public 
arbitration system. Additionally, ACAS, by creating a Scheme which guided 
arbitrators in a regulated way has allowed the regulation of arbitrator’s actions during 
hearings. As with the CCMA, ACAS has its own Code of Practice500 which was 
formed with the intention to ensure that arbitrators determine the terms of reference 
and reiterate the standards of reasonableness throughout the process.501 This 
mechanism reemphasised the importance of upholding disciplinary procedures in the 
workplace by striving to resolve disputes internally before taking further action.  
Since its formation in 1972, ACAS has been developing as an institution in 
England. The implementation of the Scheme proved successful in that disputes were 
resolved much swifter during arbitrations.502 Despite the guidance and accessibility it 
provides, there are still certain conditions which require improvement. Suggested 
improvements were noted in chapter six, where it is shown that ACAS tends to fall 
short in areas where the CCMA thrives. The need for reasons when making an 
award, an appropriate review system and making arbitration a compulsory process as 
opposed to it being voluntary would aid in improving the low referral rates for 
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arbitration through ACAS.503 Further awareness needs to be carried out by ACAS to 
educate ACAS users of the alternative mechanisms within the body.  
It was found that the CCMA has faced an increasing caseload with a 
significant lack of financial and human resources. Criticism of its inconsistency 
when making decisions, and the tension between s 138 and the CCMA Guidelines on 
Misconduct Arbitrations in relation to commissioners’ decisions add to its 
deficiencies. It is suggested that amendments and clarifications be made so as to 
maintain informality, efficiency and fairness in the CCMA’s approach to arbitration 
proceedings. 
 Furthermore, ACAS and the CCMA require improvements which can be 
implemented through a variety of quality control surveys, awareness of the institute’s 
arbitration procedures and training workshops for arbitrators. These suggestions 
could aid in improving the approach which arbitrators take towards their hearings as 
well as their skills. In turn, the need for legal advisors and other legal technicalities 
may be reduced. 
Despite its aforementioned flaws, the CCMA has proven to be a success even 
though it has not been around for as long as ACAS. Ironically, despite the historical 
umbilical cord attached between South Africa and England, the progress the CCMA 
has made in dispute resolution appears to exceed that of ACAS. It is clear that both 
systems can learn from the other, despite the fact that England is a much more 
developed country than South Africa. Both institutions tend to implement similar 
systems despite their different approaches, and research should continuously be 
undertaken for the best development of their practices. Dismissals remain inevitable 
in every country and therefore, it is worth noting that the adoption of public 
arbitration proves to be a growing necessity across the world as a mechanism of 
promoting efficiency and reducing dismissal claims whilst meeting the needs of 




                                                
503 ACAS. 2016/2017 Annual Report and Accounts, Government Publication available at < 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/e/s/Acas-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf> last accessed 10 









1.1.1 South Africa 
Carephone v Marcus NO & Others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
CCMA v The Law Society of Northern Provinces 2013 34 ILJ 2779 (SCA). 
Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule 2004 3 BLLR 214 (SCA). 
Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae) 
2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA). 
Le Monde Luggage CC t/a Pakwells Petje v Dunn NO & Others 2007 28 ILJ 2238 
(LAC). 
Mpahlehle v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC) 12. 
Naraindath v CCMA 2000 21 ILJ 1151 (LC). 
Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics Mudau NO & Others 2009 4 
BLLR 299 (LAC). 
NUMSA & Others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 BLLR 430 (SCA). 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others 2007 12 BCLR 1097 (CC). 
 
1.1.2 United Kingdom 
Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd 1987 UKHL 8. 
R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor 2017 UKSC 51. 
R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor 2017 UKSC 51. 
 
1.2 Legislation and other regulatory instruments 
 
1.2.1 South Africa 
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (Schedule 8 to the LRA). 
CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitration GenN 602 GG 34573 of 2 September 
2011. 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996. 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 16 ILJ 278 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings Before the CCMA GNR 1448 GG 25515 of 10 
October 2003  
 
1.2.2 England 
ACAS Arbitration Scheme (England and Wales) Order 2001. 
ACAS Code on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 2004. 




Arbitration Act 27 of 1950. 
Employment Act 24 of 2008. 
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 8 of 1998 
Employment Rights Act 18 of 1996. 
Employment Tribunals Act 17 of 1996. 
Industrial Relations Act 72 of 1971. 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 52 of 1992. 
 
1.3 International Instruments 
 
New York Convention of 1975 
 
1.4 Government Publications 
 
1.4.1 South Africa 
CCMA. (2008). Annual Report 2007/2008. Report Number 55/2008. CCMA 
Publications. Johannesburg. 
CCMA. 2015/2016 Annual Report. Report Number 209/2016. CCMA Publications. 
Report of the Wiehahn Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation (“Wiehahn 
Report”) Part. I RP 47/1979. 
 
1.4.2 United Kingdom 
ACAS. 2016/2017 Annual Report and Accounts, Government Publication available 
at < http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/e/s/Acas-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf> last 
accessed 10 January 2018. 
DTI, Routes to Resolution: Improving Dispute Resolution in Britain (2001). 
 




Brand, J; Lotter, C; Mischke, C and Steadman, F, “Labour Dispute Resolution,” 
(1997) Juta & Co. Ltd. 
Cabrelli D, “Employment Law in Context,” 2nd ed (2016) Oxford. 
Deakin S, Gillian S Morris, “Labour Law,” 5th ed (2009). 
Du Toit D, Godfrey S, Cooper C et al “Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive 
Guide,” 6th ed (2015). 
Grogan J, “Labour litigation and dispute resolution,” 1st ed (2010). 
Hardy et al, “ADR in Employment Law,” 1st ed (2003) Cavendish Publishing. 
Jordaan B, “Jordaan & Stelzner Labour Arbitration with a commentary on the 
CCMA rules,” 2nd ed (2011). 
Lewicki, R.J., Barry, B. & Saunder, D.M. (eds), “Negotiation: readings, exercises 




Mischke, C (adapted by Brand, J) “Overview of the dispute system,” in Brand, J et a1 
Labour Dispute Resolution 2nd ed (2008) Juta. 
Towers B, “The Handbook of Employment Relations: Law and Practice,” 4th ed 
(2004) London & Sterling. 
Van Niekerk A & Smit N, “Law @work,” 3rd ed (2015). 
 
2.1.1 E-books 
Coulson R, “Labour Arbitration: What you need to know,” 5th ed (2003) JurisNet. 
P Davies & M Freedland, "Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law," (1983) 12. 
Roberts, S.A. & Palmer, M, "Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms of 
Decision Making" (2005) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
3. Journal Articles 
 
Backer, W and Olivier, M, “Guide to the New Labour Relations Act,” (1996). 
Benjamin P, “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA),” (2013). 
Benjamin P, “Beyond Dispute Resolution: The Evolving Role of the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration,” (2014) 35 ILJ. 
Benjamin P, “Conciliation, Arbitration and Enforcement: The CCMA’s 
Achievements and Challenges,” (2009) 30 ILJ 26. 
Benjamin, P “Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of the 
CCMA,” (2007) 28 ILJ. 
Bennet, “Montana’s Employment Protection; A Comparative Critique of Montana’s 
Wrongful Discharge from the Employment Act in light of the United Kingdom’s 
Unfair Dismissal Law” Vol 57 MLR 
Brown A, “ACAS arbitration: a case of consumer satisfaction?” (1992) IRJ Vol 23 
Issue 3 231. 
Byrnes J, “The constitution and the people,” American Bar Association Journal 
(1939) 25(8)). 
Clark J, “Adversarial and Investigative Approaches to the arbitral resolution of 
dismissal disputes: A comparison of South Africa and the UK,” ILO Vol 28 No 4 
(1999). 
Clark J, “Arbitration is dismissal disputes in South Africa and the UK,” (1997) 18 
ILJ 609. 
Colling T, “No Claim, No Pain? The Privatization of Dispute Resolution in Britain,” 
(2004) Vol 25 Issue 4 pg 555-579. 
Earnshaw J & Hardy S, “Assessing an Arbitral Route for Unfair Dismissal,” (2001) 
ILJ Vold 30. 
Fergus E & Rycroft A, “Refining review,” (2012) Acta Juridica p 75 -170. 
Ferreira G, “The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration: Its 





Genn, H., Lever, B., Gray, L. & Balmer, N. (2006). Tribunals for diverse users. 
Research report. DCA Research Series. Vol. 1. London: Department for 
Constitutional Affairs. 
Gibbons, M, “Better Dispute Resolution: A Review of Employment Dispute 
Resolution in Great Britain” (2007) DTI 5. 
Leonard Rico, “Legislating Against Unfair Dismissal: Implications from British 
Experience,” 8 Berkley. J. EMP & Lab. L. (1986). 
Levy, A & Venter, T, “Research findings: CCMA, bargaining councils and private 
cases,” Tokiso Review 2006/7(2006) Johannesburg: Tokiso Dispute Settlement ILJ 
34(4) p 5 - 42. 
Lewis R & Clark J, “Employment Rights, Industrial Tribunals and Arbitration: The 
case for Alternative Dispute Resolution,” (1993). 
O’Regan, C, “The development of private labour arbitration in South Africa: A 
review of the arbitration awards,” (1989) 10 ILJ p 557. 
Sanders A, “Part One of the Employment Act 2008: “Better” Dispute Resolution?” 
(2009) ILJ Vol 38.  
Steenkamp A & Bosch C, “Labour dispute resolution under the 1995 LRA: 
Problems, pitfalls and potential,” (2012) Acta Juridica p 121. 
Ury W.L., Brett, J.M. & Goldberg S.B, “Three approaches to resolving disputes: 
interests, rights and power,” (1988). 
 
3.1 Working Paper 
Bhorat, H., Pauw, K. & Mncube, L. “Understanding the Efficiency and Effectiveness 
of the Dispute Resolution System in South Africa: An Analysis of CCMA Data” 
(2007) Development Policy Research Unit. 
Theron J, “The Shift to Service and Triangular Employment,” (2007) Working Paper 
Development Policy Research Unit, UCT.  
 
4. Internet Sources 
 
ACAS, <http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=2174> last accessed 8th 
January 2018 
 “CCMA,” < http://www.ccma.org.za/About-Us/Regional-Offices> last accessed 28th 
October 2017. 
"CCMA,"<https://www.ccma.org.za/Advice/Knowledge-Hub/Downloads/Codes-
Procedures>" last accessed 7th February 2018 
CCMA, < https://www.ccma.org.za/Media/ArticleID/101/CCMA-CAPACITY-
BUILDING-AND-OUTREACH-SERVICES> last accessed 26th January 2018. 
“Citizen’s Advice,” <https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/problems-at-
work/employment-tribunals/employer-s-response-to-an-employment-tribunal-
claim/> last accessed 27th January 2018. 
Sen Amit, “The Role of Acas in dispute resolution,” < 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/8/p/The_role_of_Acas_in_dispute_resolution.pdf
> last accessed 5th January 2018. 
